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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS
SEPTEMBER 2010
PHILIP PABLO MELLIZO, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter Skott and Professor Jeffrey Carpenter

Overview
Economists typically understand the firm as an organization comprised of
a series of incomplete contracts among input suppliers (e.g. Coase, (1937),
Williamson, (1985)). The ultimate right to make decisions that are not subject to a
pre-existing contractual arrangement – hereafter referred to as decision-control
rights, are assigned to some person or group associated with the enterprise. The
entity with decision-control rights has the final say over how to organize
essential firm operations that range from the determination of production
techniques, to deciding how to monitor or compensate the firm's members. 1 To
1

As an example, if management is held accountable by all of the laborers (or shareholders as the case
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the extent that firm members have competing interests or are asymmetrically
affected by such decisions, those members with decision-control rights may be
confronted with important normative issues regarding which firm objectives
should be pursued. In my dissertation, I employ a behavioral economic
perspective in order to examine how workplace governance practices interact
with both the level of satisfaction and motivation of workers.
In the first essay of the dissertation, I collected data from a real-effort
experiment to compare changes in the performance of research participants that
were subjected to an identical set of wage incentives that were either
implemented (1) endogenously by the group to which subjects belong through a
simple majority vote, (2) endogenously by only one member of the group who
had all decision-control rights, or (3) a random process completely exogenous to
the group. The 3 (3 distinct decision-control rights regimes) X 2 (2 distinct
incentive contracts) between-subjects design allows for a clean comparison of
performance under different decision-control rights treatments. I report
evidence suggesting that the decision-control rights arrangement used to select
the compensation contract can significantly influence the subsequent level of
performance of research subjects.

may be) in the firm insofar that they can override or replace management of the firm, then the decisioncontrol rights are ultimately held by labor and not the management.
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The second essay (co-authored with Michael Carr), analyzes the relative
effects of voice, autonomy, and wages in explaining job satisfaction using
subjective evaluations of work conditions and satisfaction recorded in the 2004
wave of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). We show that the
amount of autonomy and voice that a worker has over the firm is an important
omitted variable, biasing the estimated coefficient on the wage upwards. And,
conditional upon having a job, voice and autonomy are considerably more
important determinants of job satisfaction than the wage.
The final essay offers a critique of the traditional economics of work
organization in consideration of the literature developed in behavioral and
experimental economics. I argue that many models of worker motivation
developed using the rational choice model (RCM) carry the cost of ignoring
common sentiments and behaviors that have been systematically demonstrated
in experimental studies. After providing an extensive review of the experimental
economics literature as it may inform various workplace organizational faculties,
I conclude that the literature suggests that establishment of work teams and
incentive schemes that reward teams for collective success would carry the
expectation of sustained satisfaction and productivity of workers more than firm
environments that rely on employee competition as a motivational device.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Economists typically understand the firm as an organization comprised of
a series of incomplete contracts among input suppliers (e.g. Coase, (1937),
Williamson, (1985)). The ultimate right to make decisions that are not subject to a
preexisting contractual arrangement – hereafter referred to as decision-control
rights, are assigned to some person or group associated with the enterprise. The
entity with decision-control rights will have the final say over how to organize
essential firm operations that range from the determination of production
techniques, to deciding how to monitor or compensate the employees. 1 To the
extent that different firm members have competing interests or are
asymmetrically affected by such decisions, those members with decision-control
rights may be confronted with important normative issues regarding which firm
objectives should be pursued. For example, it may be the case that policies that
pursue firm profits for shareholders would be distinct from those that maximize
net-income per worker (Vanek, 1970), or similarly, policies intended to promote
higher short term growth rates might be in conflict with various “quality of
work-life” goals that would otherwise be pursued by workers with control
1

As an example, if management is held accountable by all of the laborers (or shareholders as the case
may be) in the firm insofar that they can override or replace management of the firm, then the decisioncontrol rights are ultimately held by labor and not the management.

1

rights. Of course, different decision-control rights distributions (e.g. board of
directors consisting of shareholders, labor-managed firms, employee
representation, co-governance etc.) can be expected to arise in practice
depending on various factors including the willingness for firm members
without decision-control rights to consent to those with decision-control rights,
the legal restrictions outlined by local or national governments, and the
procedural norms common among firm members.
Investment that expands the capital stock or towards technological
development generally lead to higher levels of firm efficiency, but productivity is
not determined exclusively by technologies and small changes in the
productivity of labor could potentially have a large impact. Thus the viability of
a firm in a competitive economy is contingent upon its ability to sustain
sufficiently high levels of labor productivity. The dissertation investigates the
interaction between the organizational and decision-making processes and
productivity of labor. This question has received a fair amount of attention by
economists over the years (e.g. Alchien and Demsetz, (1972); Holmstrom, (1982);
Levin and Tyson, (1990)), but the existing literature has at least three significant
shortcomings.
First, the vast majority of the theoretical analysis in labor and personnel

2

economics is based on the rational choice model (RCM) where all agents
rationally optimize their private material gains across all social contexts. The
study of price incentives in the RCM has produced valuable models of incentives,
compensation, and job search. These developments, however, have come at the
cost of ignoring common behaviors and psychological tendencies such as loss
aversion, guilt, procrastination, envy, consent to authority, happiness, altruism,
or solidarity. Those aspects of behavior, which are excluded from the RCM,
surely influence workplace performance. The investigation of these issues,
however, has received surprisingly little attention in Economics; including
Behavioral Economics.
Second, empirical work that investigates how different decision-control
rights arrangements affect firm performance face difficult challenges. It is hard
to adequately control for firm idiosyncrasies in production and organization, the
level of industrial concentration, the presence or absence of price-controls or
subsidies, state-specific tax structures, and general labor market conditions,
when investigating a specific behavioral relationship. These difficulties suggest
that controlled lab experiments might provide a testing ground to evaluate
behavior under various organizational structures. Although experiments can
only claim to be stylized representations of real-world economies, experiments

3

often reveal systematic behavioral tendencies typically not accounted for by
standard assumptions. Despite the many empirical studies that have sought to
investigate how the distribution of decision-control rights affects productivity, to
the best of my knowledge, none have used the experimental methodology to test
this directly.
Finally, while research in neighboring behavioral sciences has advanced
our collective knowledge of human motivation, satisfaction, and other important
job attitudes, economists have generally not operated within this
interdisciplinary space. For example, in dealing with the canonical 'agency
problem,' the economic perspective has primarily focused on how best to use
monetary incentives to align the interests of managers and capital owners. It is
likely, however, that additional psychological, social, or political factors influence
principal-agent outcomes. The large body of work dedicated to investigating
these issues in Organizational Behavior, Management Studies, and Industrial
Psychology, are only cross-referenced by Economists in exceptional cases. While
it is certainly a challenge to organize and translate concepts across disciplines in
a systematic and coherent manner, the potential benefits from interdisciplinary
study are large.
In the dissertation, I contribute to filling these deficiencies. In the first
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essay, I collected data from a real-effort experiment to compare changes in the
performance of research participants that were subjected to an identical set of
wage incentives that were either implemented (1) endogenously by the group to
which subjects belong through a simple majority vote, (2) endogenously by only
one member of the group who had all decision-control rights, or (3) a random
process completely exogenous to the group. I compare performance across
treatments (between-subjects design) and report evidence suggesting that the
decision-control rights arrangement used to select the compensation contract can
significantly influence the subsequent level of performance of research subjects.
The second essay conducts an econometric exercise that analyzes the
relative effects of voice, autonomy, and wages in explaining job satisfaction using
subjective evaluations of work conditions and satisfaction recorded in the 2004
wave of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). We show that the
variability of employee satisfaction is driven by subjective evaluation scores of
worker autonomy and voice. Our findings suggest that while wages may be an
important determinant of job choice, it is not the most important determinant of
job satisfaction, particularly when compared to autonomy and employee voice.
The final essay reviews experimental economic work that has aimed to
test personnel models of incentive contracts, the role of general labor market

5

conditions, loyalty, job satisfaction, intrinsic motivation, and the effect of
different firm governance structures. Because the firm is partly a kind of
marketplace -- with institutions that support specific contractual exchange
relations -- and partly a place where people interact expressively as whole
personalities, economists need to go beyond the RCM to understand the effects
of organizational structures on the productivity and motivation of workers. The
review shows that a substantial gap remains between the work in industrial
psychology and that done within economics on examining the motivational
effects of different workplace governance practices and asset ownership
distributions. Experimental methodologies, however, offer a method to test
several behavioral claims made outside of economics, and also facilitate their
inclusion into economic practice.

6

CHAPTER 2
AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF PERFORMANCE
UNDER HIERARCHICAL AND PARTICIPATORY DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES
2.1 Introduction

Firms constantly make decisions that affect the conditions of work for
their employees. The economics literature shows strong disagreements over both
how such decisions should be reached, and which firm members should be
included in making these decisions. The most common model of firm
governance employs a centralized decision-making authority, but participatory
models that delegate decision-making responsibilities to workers can be
regularly observed. For example, Kruse et al. (2008) find that up to 40% of
employees in the U.S. report having a lot of influence on firm decisions or say
they often participate with other workers in job decisions. Historically, the push
for “employee empowerment initiatives” and similar programs have often been
seen as responding to general concerns of fairness, job satisfaction, workplace
trust, and perhaps most importantly for economists, as promoting the
productivity of workers (e.g. Freeman and Rogers (2006), Dow, (2003)).

7

While scores of studies have sought to compare how different firmgovernance structures help or hinder the attainment of firm goals, it has proven
difficult to resolve whether the decision-making architecture of the firm is
associated with a systematic behavioral effect on the motivation and subsequent
performance of workers.2 Much of the ambiguity in the empirical literature may
be due to the difficulty of controlling for confounding factors such as distinct
production technologies, market conditions, monitoring structures, and
compensation methods that complicate identification of worker performance.
Another hurdle that labor economists are traditionally confronted with is how to
control for employee ability when evaluating how a policy or governance
structure affects worker performance. Self-reports, attitudinal surveys, IQ tests,
years of education, quality of education, resume quality, years of job experience,
and managerial evaluations have been used in many labor studies to
approximate unobservable worker characteristics like skill and intrinsic
motivation. These proxy measures can be noisy and this may also contribute to
mixed findings in the literature.
In an effort to mitigate the confounding issues, this paper uses a controlled
2

The meta-analysis conducted by Levin and Tyson (1990) analyzing the effects of participation on
productivity conclude that, “Our overall assessment of the empirical literature from economics,
industrial relations, organizational behavior and other social sciences is that participation usually leads
to small, short-run improvements in performance and sometimes leads to significant, long-lasting
improvements in performance” (emphasis in original).
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laboratory experiment to investigate whether the performance of workers is
sensitive to the provision of decision-control rights over a meaningful decision –
the determination of workers' compensation structure.
We collected data from a real-effort experiment to compare changes in the
performance of research participants subjected to an identical set of wage
incentives that were either implemented (1) endogenously by the group to which
subjects belong through a simple majority vote, (2) endogenously by only one
member of the group who had all decision-control rights, or (3) a random
process completely exogenous to the group. By design, we control for all issues
that pertain to monitoring, punishment, threats, or other forms of coercion that
might also accompany many types of systems of control in real-world firms.
The data collected in our experiment limit our investigation to an
examination of observed behavioral differences that arise under different
decision-making processes for group decisions. We further strip down the effort
task so that it is not reliant on team production technologies to minimize
confounds that could arise in social dilemmas (i.e. trust, reciprocity, reputation
etc) and restrict the menu of potential compensation schemes, to two where all
claims on residual profits are held by labor. Our real-effort task additionally
allows us to collect measures of both effort (trying hard) and effective effort

9

(quality of work).
We use a 3 (3 distinct decision-control rights regimes) X 2 (2 distinct
incentive contracts) between-subjects design in order to have an apples-to-apples
comparison of performance under different decision-control rights treatments.
All subjects in each session of our experiment participated in 3 periods. In Period
1, all subjects were paid a flat-wage to solve simple addition problems for 5
minutes. The instructions in Period 1 made clear that all subjects would receive a
flat-wage that was independent of their effort in Period 1. In Period 2 of the
experiment, all subjects were randomly and anonymously put into groups of 3,
and were told that they would be again be solving problems for 5 minutes, but
that the method by which they would be compensated for their performance in
Period 2 was contingent upon the implementation of one of two possible
incentive contracts – either a rank-order tournament with endogenous prize
creation (referred to as CS1 in the experiment instructions), or a group revenuesharing contract (referred to as CS2 in the experiment instructions). Depending
on the treatment that subjects were in, the decision over which compensation
scheme would be implemented for the duration of Period 2 was either made 1)
endogenously by vote where all 3 group members had equitable decision-control
rights (hereafter referred to as the Voting treatment), 2) endogenously by a single
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group member determined at random with all decision-control rights (Authority
treatment), or 3) exogenously by the computer (Control treatment). Period 3 in
our experiment was identical to Period 1, where subjects were again paid a flatwage for 5-minutes to solve addition problems.
We report evidence suggesting that the performance of subjects in our
experiment is sensitive to the decision-control rights arrangement used to select
the compensation contract. Consistent with intuition, allowing groups of
workers to participate in determining the compensation scheme for their group
increases effort significantly. While this may not be surprising, ours is the first
study to confirm the intuitive result for group level decisions. Specifically, we
find that both endogenous decision-making arrangements in our study result in
significantly higher performance -- measured both in total effort provided, and
effective effort-- than decisions made by a random process completely exogenous
to the group. Further, these effects persist even after controlling for gender,
compensation scheme, expressed preferences for a compensation scheme, and
ability.

11

2.2 Related Research

Labor costs account for the vast majority of production costs, implying
that small increases in effort per worker can have a significant influence on
output production (Blinder (1990)), but the level of effort that workers provide
cannot be directly contracted (Bowles and Gintis, (1988)). This familiar agency
dilemma has spawned a great deal of research into the potential motivational
properties of different compensation schemes (e.g. Stiglitz, (1975), Lazear and
Rosen, (1981)), monitoring structures (e.g. Alchien and Demzetz (1972), general
labor market conditions (e.g. Shapiro and Stiglitz, (1984)) and other 'strategic
human resource management' designs that are developed with the intention of
influencing the level of effort offered by workers.3 The vast majority of the
theoretical work in this tradition is rooted in identifying incentives that would
appeal to the rational actor, yet personnel issues like worker motivation can be
much more complicated and for this reason, its analysis will likely require a
behavioral perspective. Berg (2006) points out that in a field like labor economics
that is so heavily data driven, the incorporation of experiments as a research
methodology has been relatively limited.4
3

4

See Prendergast (1999) for excellent survey on theory and practice of incentive mechanisms and Baron
and Kreps (1999) for an introduction to contemporary themes in personnel management.
For a general overview on the use of experiments in labor market experiments see Falk and Fehr (2003).
For reviews of findings, see Mellizo (2010) and Charness and Kuhn (2010).
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The use of experiments to investigate labor and personnel matters,
however, has already contributed much to the field of study. For example,
experiments have 'cleanly' revealed that incentive structures that should elicit
equivalent effort from rational and selfish agents, influence humans in
systematically different ways. For example, Bull et al. (1987) compare the
efficacy of tournaments and piece-rates in a chosen-effort lab experiment, finding
that mean effort levels under either compensation scheme were roughly
equivalent, but further found that a much larger variance was observed within
all of their tournament specifications, than under the piece-rate scheme. In a
similar vein, van Dijk et al. (2001) use a real-effort experiment finding that
individual and team payment schemes induced similar effort levels, while
Freeman and Gelber (2010) observe that output for groups under tournament
contracts that result in moderate levels of inequality was significantly higher
than when payment was either independent of the participants' performance, or
when the level of inequality resulting from the tournament prize was high. Of
course, by now behavioral findings that are inconsistent with predictions of the
rational actor model no longer come as a surprise to economists, but much more
importantly, the use of experiments has shown that in many cases both nonrational, and non-selfish behavioral deviations from the standard theoretical
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predictions are systematic, common, and replicable (e.g. Rabin, 1998). Moreover,
the expanded use of the experimental method has helped in revealing
preferences that reflect the norms and values supported by different social
environments (e.g. Henrich et al. (2001))
To illustrate the last point as it relates to workplace organization, many
firms are structured to encourage competition among their employees, yet it has
been reported that competitive institutions might bias performance outcomes for
workers. For example, Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) find that one
source of systematic variation in performance of solving mazes can be explained
by gender, where the performance of women is less responsive to competitive
environments than it is for men in their sample. Similarly, Niederle and
Vesterlund (2007) find evidence suggestive of gendered attitudes towards
competition-- that is, given the choice to enter or not enter a competitive
environment, many women would prefer not to, even when it would be in their
monetary interest to do so. They additionally find, however, that men often elect
to enter into competitive situations far more often than they should. While the
experimental economics literature has only begun to explore why there are
gendered attitudes towards competition, findings from a very interesting field
experiment conducted by Gneezy, Leonard, and List (2006) suggest that
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processes of socialization play a central role in shaping preferences towards
competition. They find that women in matriarchal societies are more likely to
demonstrate a preference to compete than men, while the reverse was true in
patriarchal societies. To the extent that these findings are externally valid to firm
environments in patriarchal societies, they may contribute to an explanation for
persistent asymmetries common in labor market outcomes, such as the large
discrepancies between the proportion of males and females in competitive
professions.5 Other studies, however, have shown that if subjects are allowed to
sort themselves into (or away from) a particular wage-structure that the outcome
typically results in higher average levels in performance (e.g. Cadsby et al.
(2005); Eriksson et al. (2006); Teyssiar (2008); Dohmen and Falk (2006)).
While it is certainly the case that some workers study the institutional
features of the firm prior to entry, we analyze the situation where firms change
working conditions for existing employees. Our study extends the literature by
using the lab to explore how the distribution of control rights over a firm-level
decision determining the compensation scheme for workers influences worker
performance. Dal Bo et al. (2007) and Sutter et al. (2006) suggest that democratic
processes over the selection of group-level institutions can affect the level of
5

See Croson and Gneezy (2009) for an excellent review of the experimental economics literature
highlighting gendered differences in attitudes and behavior and their potential impacts on labor market
outcomes.

15

cooperation observed in social dilemmas, but we believe ours to be the first
experimental study to directly examine the impact of different decision making
processes on worker performance.

2.3 Experiment Design

In the Fall term of 2008, we recruited members of the University of
Massachusetts-Amherst community via table-tents, fliers, and brief
announcements given in lecture halls. The participants in our study were not
informed about the precise nature of the experiment before arrival. In our
recruitment, we promised a $5.00 show-up fee, plus the chance to earn additional
money in the experiment. Our recruitment procedure allowed subjects to selfselect into a time-slot that was convenient for their own schedule, and we
confirmed their participation by email. We conducted 21 sessions over a threeweek period. Upon arriving at the experiment, a subject's experience in all
treatments followed the following protocol. First all subjects signed a consent
form for their participation and were seated at a computer terminal where they
found a sheet introducing the study to them and a copy of instructions for Period
1 of the experiment. After all subjects were seated, a lab assistant read both the
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introduction of the experiment, as well as the set of instructions for Period 1. All
subjects in all sessions received the same instructions for Period 1.
In Period 1 of the experiment, all subjects were paid a flat-wage contract of
75 Experimental Units (30EUs = 1USD) for the task of adding together different
sets of five two-digit numbers that appeared on their computer screen.
Participants were not allowed to use a calculator, but could use scratch paper and
a pencil that were provided to them. After solving a problem, a subject would
submit their answer and would be presented with a new problem to solve. The
numbers to be added together were randomly generated, but all subjects in a
given treatment were presented with the same set of math problems, given in the
same order. We chose to use this specific real-effort because (1) we would expect
adding sets of numbers together to yield a low intrinsic reward, (2) it requires
little skill, (3) a typical college aged subject is familiar with simple arithmetic, and
most importantly, (4) previous studies have found that this same real-effort task
did not result in biased performance in any systematic manner (Niederle and
Vesterlund, (2007)).6 When the 5 minutes of Period 1 were over, subjects were
6

The program was written using zTree (Fischbacher 2007). We gratefully acknowledge Muriel Niederle
and Lise Vesterlund for sharing their zTree code used in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) for the
production task of adding up sets of 5, 2-digit numbers. The only difference between our instrument
and the one used in Niederle and Vesterlund's piece is that in our experiment all subjects receive the
same set of randomly generated math problems in the same order, where in the former paper each
subject receives a new, randomly generated set of numbers in each math problem. We made this
adjustment in response to feedback surveys in our pilot runs where some subjects (unexpectedly) made
the claim that they were concerned with the set of numbers that they might have to solve compared with
other subjects. That is, some subjects wanted to be sure that they would be solving the same problems
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presented with a screen that displayed how many problems they correctly solved
as well as a reminder of their earnings in Period 1 (a flat-wage of 75EUs).
Subjects were not given any information regarding the performances of any other
subjects at this time. At this point, the subjects received a new set of instructions
for Period 2 of the experiment.
At the beginning of Period 2 of the experiment, subjects were informed
that they had randomly and anonymously been assigned to a group of 3 total
subjects. Group members were connected only through the computer network,
and for the remainder of the experiment the subjects never knew who was in
their group. In the instructions for Period 2, subjects received a message
indicating to them that one of two possible compensation schemes would be
implemented and that the scheme would affect the payout of all members of
their group. Both of the possible compensation schemes were simple incentive
contracts where each correct answer from each member of the group was equal
to the exogenously determined price of 10EUs. In Period 2, all of the correct
answers from all members of each group were summed together and multiplied
by 10EU to create the total proceeds to the group. The only distinction between
the compensation contracts in Period 2 was the manner by which the total

as everyone else. To eliminate the potential for any noise arise in our data due to this concern, we made
this minor adjustment to the original z-tree code used in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).
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proceeds were distributed back to the members within each group. Under the
tournament scheme, the person with the highest number of contributions to the
group total was to receive 60% of all of the group proceeds, the second highest
performer would receive 30% of the proceeds, and the third highest performer
would receive 10% of the proceeds. All ties were broken at random. Under the
revenue-sharing contract, the total proceeds were simply multiplied by a factor
of 1/n so all members within the group would receive an equal share of the
group proceeds. The instructions also described how the decision to implement
either compensation scheme would be made. In each session only one treatment
(i.e. one decision-making process) was implemented. Subjects had no prior
knowledge of which treatments would be run in a given session. The three
decision-treatments are described below.

2.3.1 Decision-Treatments

Voting Treatment: In the Voting Treatment, all members in the group had
equal decision-making rights in either implementing the tournament or
the revenue-sharing contract. The specific procedure used was a
simple voting election where only a simple majority was required to
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implement either compensation scheme.

Authority Treatment: In the Authority Treatment, all members in the
group were informed that one of the three members would decide
whether to implement the tournament or the revenue-sharing contract.
Subjects in this treatment were informed that the decision maker would
be determined randomly by the computer.

Control Treatment: In the Control Treatment, all members in the group
were informed that the implementation of either the tournament or
revenue sharing contract would be done at random by the computer
program.

Before the 5-minute period of solving math problems began in Period 2, all
subjects were informed of the outcome from the decision-making process
regarding how they would be compensated for their efforts for the duration of
Period 2. At the end of the 5-minutes period, all subjects were presented with a
screen indicating to them how many correct answers they provided, the group
total of correct answers, their individual payoff, and their relative rank within
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their group of three. At this point, all subjects received a set of instructions for
Period 3 of the experiment.
Period 3 was identical to Period 1 with the exception of the math problems
presented. Like Period 1, subjects in Period 3 were compensated a flat-wage of
75 EUs to solve simple addition problems for 5 minutes. At the end of Period 3,
all subjects were again presented with a summary screen indicating how many
correct answers they had in Period 3, along with a reminder of their
compensation in Period 3.
We collected Period 3 data for two main reasons. First, like Period 1 data,
they provide an additional observation of ability and/or the willingness for
subjects to provide effort in the absence of extrinsic incentives. We also collect
Period 3 data to conduct an auxiliary analysis in section 2.4.3 examining if Period
3 effort could be explained by different experiment conditions.
After Period 3 a brief survey was administered through the computer
program that asked about a variety of background characteristics. When all
subjects were finished with the survey, each participant was called to the back of
the room at random by number, where they received their payment in a sealed
envelope.
A total of 270 subjects (133 woman, 137 men) participated in the
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experiment. Subjects were predominately undergraduate students. The average
overall payoff in the experiment was about $14.00 and the duration of each
session lasted for approximately 45 minutes.

2.3.2 Pilot Experiments

It is important to note that the experiment was designed to compare
behavior under exogenous and endogenous decision-making processes, and not
to compare performances under different compensation schemes. With this in
mind, we wanted to create menus of compensation schemes that would be both
very simple for subjects to understand, and that would each be reasonably
appealing. The contrasting qualities of the basic tournament and the revenuesharing contract simplify the decision for subjects increasing the possibility that
the variance of behavior in the data can be attributed to treatment, rather than to
possible confusion over the exact rules of each compensation scheme.
The precise specification of the rank-order tournament used in our
experiment (highest performer receives 60% or the total group proceeds, second
highest performer receives 30% and lowest performer received 10%) was
informed by several pilot experiments conducted with subjects from a separate
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subject pool several weeks before the 'live' data collection began. In the pilot
experiments we wanted to collect several samples of preferences over various
tournament specifications relative to the revenue-sharing contract to increase the
probability that each compensation contract would be selected with a reasonable
amount of behavioral regularity when 'live' data collection began. Without
extensive piloting of the tournament specification, we would have had to rely on
theoretical predictions that would require the construction of bias in preferences
(i.e. designing a tournament based on selfish preferences or with social
preferences). We concluded our pilot experiments when roughly half of our pilot
subjects expressed a preference for the 60-30-10 tournament structure and the
other half expressed a preference for the revenue sharing contract. During the
live data collection process, 57 groups in the Authority treatment (where
decision-control rights were held by a single group member) selected the
tournament contract and 33 selected the revenue sharing contract (90 total
groups). Of the the 93 groups in the Voting treatment (where decision-control
rights were held by all group members) the majority voting rule resulted in 57
tournament contracts and 36 revenue sharing contracts implemented by those
groups.
We took the further precaution of first collecting data from the treatments
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with endogenous choice (Voting and Authority treatments) and then calibrated
the randomization procedure in the Control treatment to match the frequency of
the compensation scheme selection. Table 2.1 shows that these precautions, in
addition to a fair amount of luck, were very successful in generating the same
frequency of selected compensation schemes across our treatments.
Table 2.1: Frequency of Compensation Scheme Selected by Treatment
Compensation scheme
Revenue Sharing
Tournament
Total

Voting

Authority

Control

Total

36
57
93

33
57
90

33
54
87

102
168
270

Standard theory would predict that differences in the level of effort
between Period 1 (where all subjects paid a flat-wage) and Period 2 (where
subjects are paid through an incentive contract), is independent of the process by
which the incentive contract was implemented. Our study examines the validity
of this claim.

2.4 Experiment Results

In the following section we present our results from the experiment.
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2.4.1 Summary statistics

The analysis centers on effort, which we measure using the number of total
attempted questions that subjects provided in each period, as well as their
effective effort, measured by the total number of correct answers provided in each
period. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide subgroup summary statistics of total
attempted answers correct answers across periods and treatments. Histograms
and statistical tests of equivalence of means across treatments are presented in
Appendix A.
Table 2.2 Total attempted questions (Effort)
Overall
N Mean Std.Dev.
Flat-wage
(Period 1)

Voting
N Mean
Std.Dev. N

Authority
Mean Std.Dev.

Control
N
Mean
Std.Dev.

270

12.75

3.103 93

12.89

3.347

90

13.14

3.357 87

12.19

2.443

Tournament 168
(Period 2)

15.78

3.559 57

15.87

3.932

57

16.66

3.700 54

14.75

2.684

Rev Sharing 102
(Period 2)

13.98

2.883 36

13.88

3.002

33

14.39

2.946 33

14.39

2.946

Overall
(Period 2)

270

15.10

3.429 93

15.11

3.714

90

15.83

3.598 87

14.34

2.735

Flat-wage
(Period 3)

270

13.94

4.284 93

13.51

3.846

90

14.95

4.815 87

13.35

3.997
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Table 2.3 Correct Answers (Effective Effort)
Overall
N Mean Std.Dev.

Voting
Authority
N Mean Std.Dev. N Mean Std.Dev.

Control
N Mean Std.Dev.

Flat-wage
(Period1)

270 10.30 3.148

93 10.50 3.154

90 10.59

3.613

87 9.79 2.543

Tournament
(Period2)

168 12.67 3.865

57 12.84 4.161

57 13.47

4.004

54 11.64 3.169

Rev Sharing
(Period2)

102 11.14 2.939

36 10.94 2.562

33 11.54

2.937

33 10.96 3.349

Overall
(Period2)

270 12.09 3.615

93 12.11 3.728

90 12.76

3.751

87 11.39 3.236

Flat-wage
(Period3)

270 10.81 4.074

93 10.62 3.715

90 11.69

4.585

87 10.13 3.753

The top row in both tables 2.2 and 2.3 report summary performance levels
in Period 1 in all treatments (overall), and by treatment. We interpret the level of
effort provided in Period 1, where all subjects were compensated via a flat-wage
contract, as a reasonable measure of ability and/or a willingness of subjects to
provide effort in the absence extrinsic incentives. Where many empirical papers
in labor economics rely on the use of proxy measures for unobservable ability
levels, a major benefit of our experimental design is that we are able to collect an
observation of baseline ability for subjects performing this precise real-effort task,
which will become key in subsequent analysis. Standard parametric tests
reported in Appendix A (A1 and A2) suggest that there are no differences in
mean total attempted questions in Period 1 across treatments (p = .1097) or in
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correct answers across treatments in Period 1 (p = .1821). This indicates that to
the extent college-aged subjects had heterogeneous abilities in solving simple
addition problems, our randomization procedure successfully distributed these
characteristics across treatment groups.7
Figure 2.1: Column Graph of Total Effort and Correct Answers in all
Treatments and Periods

Total Attempted Questions (Effort)
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0

Correct Answers (Effective Effort)
16
14

Overall
Voting
Authority
Control

12

Overall

10

Voting

8

Authority

6

Control

4
2
0
Per. 2 (Tournament)
Per. 2 (Overall)
Period 1
Per. 2 (Rev Sharing)
Period 3

Per. 2 (Tournament)
Per. 2 (Overall)
Period 1
Per. 2 (Rev Sharing)
Period 3

Before solving math problems in Period 2, subjects were randomly and
anonymously assigned to groups of three. The determination of how they would
be compensated in Period 2 was done endogenously by vote, endogenously by a
single-decision maker in the group, or by a random exogenous process. F-tests
evaluating equivalence of mean performance across decision-making treatments
is rejected overall among subjects in Period 2 for correct answers (p = .0400) and

7

Random assignment of subjects from our subject pool to treatment occurred prior to the experiment
being run.
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total attempts (p = .0150), as well as in Period 3 for correct answers (p = 0.0323)
and total attempts (p = 0.0220).

2.4.2 Regression analysis

In the following section, we present regression analysis to provide a more
thorough examination of whether the process of implementation of the
compensation contract at the outset of Period 2 can explain divergence in effort
offered in Period 2 performance measures. Our data we meet the Gauss-Markov
criteria (with minor heteroscedasticity) therefore justifying the use of OLS with
robust standard errors.
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Table 2.4: Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 2
voting
authority
tournament
tourn_preference

(1)
0.763
(0.484)
1.489***
(0.479)

(2)
0.777
(0.473)
1.466***
(0.464)
1.793***
(0.393)

revshar_preference
male
total1

(3)
1.864**
(0.884)
1.819***
(0.535)
1.509***
(0.397)
-0.708
(0.803)
-1.641**
(0.815)

(4)
1.813**
(0.863)
1.851***
(0.532)
1.386***
(0.389)
-0.671
(0.780)
-1.207
(0.810)
1.217***
(0.403)

Constant

14.34***
13.23***
13.41***
12.79***
(0.293)
(0.381)
(0.382)
(0.454)
Observations
270
270
270
270
R-squared
0.031
0.095
0.109
0.138
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(5)
0.896*
(0.515)
0.931***
(0.314)
0.788***
(0.264)
-0.641
(0.456)
-0.649
(0.466)
0.626***
(0.241)
0.852***
(0.0456)
3.107***
(0.614)
270
0.695

The dependent variable in all regression specifications in Table 2.4
evaluates the number of total answers provided in Period 2, or what we refer to
as effort. In Regression (1), the reference category is comprised of subjects in the
Control treatment, where their compensation scheme in Period 2 was
implemented by an exogenous random process. As one can see, subjects in the
Authority treatment attempted an average of 1.489 questions more than those in
the Control treatment, and this difference is significant at the .01 level. The sign
on the coefficient for Voting is positive, but the increase in the level of effort in
Voting is not statistically significant relative to the Control. A two tail t-test
evaluating whether Voting and Authority coefficients were equal, is rejected (p
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= .1486).
The second regression specification adds an indicator variable of the
compensation scheme implemented in Period 2 as a control. This specification
assumes that the effect of the compensation scheme is constant across all
treatments, and more importantly for the purposes of our investigation, that
mean effort differences that arise from our treatments are constant across
compensation schemes. Regression 2 shows that tournament contracts,
irrespective of the manner they are implemented, result in higher levels of effort
than the revenue sharing contract. This is not an unexpected finding, but one
that serves as a general robustness check to the experimental literature where
tournament typically result in higher efforts in the lab. 8 In Regression 2 we
further notice that the coefficients and robust standard errors for both the
Authority and Voting treatments are essentially unchanged from Regression 1.
That is, subjects that had their compensation scheme implemented by a single
group member in the Authority treatment on average attempted more questions
than the Control in Period 2, after controlling for the compensation scheme
selection.
The specification in Regression 3 examines whether the difference in effort
8

See Harbring and Irlunbush (2005) for a very useful survey evaluating effort under different
tournament specifications in the lab.
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demonstrated in the treatments with endogenous selection in Period 2 is
explained by their ability to voice a specific preference in the decision-making
process. Notice that all participants in the Voting treatment and the randomly
selected member in the Authority treatment had the opportunity to express their
preferences over how they would like their group to be compensated in Period 2.
In Regression 3, we include indicator variables for the expressed preferences of
each person with decision-making power in the Authority and Voting
treatments. Interestingly, we first notice negative signs on the coefficients
suggesting that individuals with decision-making power had lower output than
those without decision-making power. Specifically, the regression suggests that a
marginal increase in the number of subjects that expressed a preference for the
revenue sharing contract was associated with decrease of 1.641 fewer total
attempted answers on average in Period 2 and that this is significant at the .05
level. While there are a number of interesting reasons why subjects may express
a preference for one compensation scheme over another, (i.e. a desire to free-ride
on others, competition averse, inequality averse, a desire to compete, etc) the
data collected herein do not allow for a thorough analysis to understand the
precise motivations for why subjects expressed the preferences they did. 9
9

In Appendix C, we show that the specifications for Regression 3 as well as the Regressions 4 and 5 are
not being driven by differences between subjects with decision-making power and without decisionmaking power.
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Nevertheless, in the third regression specification in Table 2.4 we find
evidence suggesting that democratic procedures in the Voting treatment are
associated with increased effort for all expressed preferences after controlling for
the compensation scheme. Similarly, groups that had their compensation scheme
decided by a single group member (the Authority treatment) also demonstrate an
increase in effort for all expressed preferences and compensation schemes.
Under this specification, the increased effect of voting on effort is significant at
the .05 level and the increase in effort from groups that had a single decisionmaker is significant at the .01 level. Taken together, the results under this
specification suggest that the success of a compensation scheme in influencing
performance can be different when imposed by a process external to a group,
rather than when it is imposed by an endogenous decision-making process.
Because of the well-known literature that has shown gendered attitudes
towards competition (e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007)), and performance
differences in competitive environments to be sensitive to gender (e.g. Gneezy et
al. (2003)), the regression specification in Column 4 of Table 2.4 includes a control
variable for gender. We find that on average, men in the second period provided
more effort than women, but more importantly for the purposes of our
investigation, after controlling for gender, compensation scheme, and expressed
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preferences, the treatments with endogenous selection procedures continue to
account for significant differences in performance.
Finally, in Regression 5 we include a control variable of subject ability.
Our ability measure uses the performance of subjects in Period 1 of the
experiment. Perhaps the main advantage of using an experimental design over a
tradition empirical design to study worker performance is that in the lab we are
able to collect an observable measure of ability for a specific production task in the
absence of extrinsic incentives. Indeed, a traditional weakness of many labor
economics papers examining the effects of different institutional features on
performance is not having a measure of performance, and hence having to resort
to constructing proxy measures of ability and/or relying on econometric
techniques that can be loaded with strong implicit behavioral assumptions to
control for unobservable characteristics. Our data set provide a baseline measure
of ability for subjects, which we use in Regression 5.
One might expect that individuals with higher demonstrated ability in
Period 1 would perform at higher levels in Period 2 after controlling for
compensation scheme, decision-making treatment, gender, and expressed
preference, and our findings in Regression 5 are consistent with this intuition.
Moreover, we find evidence that after including the additional control measure
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of ability, the decision-control right arrangement strongly influences the level of
performance in Period 2 with members in the Authority treatment displaying an
average increase of 0.93 total attempted questions relative to the Control which is
significant at the 0.01 level, and subjects in the Voting treatment displaying an
average increase in performance of 0.896 total attempted questions relative to the
Control, which is statistically significant at the 0.10 level. In sum, Regression 5
shows that endogenous decision processes that result the imposition of the
compensation contract result in higher performance than an exogenous contract
imposition after controlling for ability, compensation scheme, gender, and the
expressed preferences of subjects.
In Table 2.5 (shown below), we conduct the same 5 regression
specifications that were run on total effort in Table 3, but we change the
dependent variable from total attempted questions to total correct answers in Period
2 to evaluate effective effort. As one can see, our findings reported in Table 2.5 are
consistent with the qualitative and quantitative story that arises from Table 2.4
with few exceptions. Most importantly, Table 2.5 again shows that members in
the Authority treatment display a higher level of effort in Period 2 across all
regression specifications at the .01 level of significance than the reference
categories, again suggesting that the process of implementation has an effect on
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performance even after controlling for compensation scheme, expressed
preferences for those with decision-making power, gender, and our baseline
ability measure.
Table 2.5: Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 2
voting
authority
tournament
tourn_preference

(1)
0.717
(0.519)
1.376***
(0.526)

(2)
0.729
(0.513)
1.357***
(0.518)
1.514***
(0.415)

revshar_preference
male
correct1
Constant

(3)
2.266**
(0.936)
1.860***
(0.589)
1.226***
(0.443)
-1.152
(0.836)
-2.100**
(0.857)

(4)
2.221**
(0.920)
1.889***
(0.586)
1.117**
(0.439)
-1.120
(0.815)
-1.714**
(0.856)
1.083**
(0.437)

11.39***
10.45***
10.63***
10.08***
(0.347)
(0.440)
(0.451)
(0.513)
Observations
270
270
270
270
R-squared
0.024
0.065
0.084
0.104
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(5)
1.095*
(0.588)
1.075***
(0.388)
0.618*
(0.346)
-1.024**
(0.505)
-0.595
(0.535)
0.813**
(0.315)
0.808***
(0.0559)
2.629***
(0.676)
270
0.569

2.4.3 Period 3 Data

In both Period 1 and Period 3 subjects were compensated a flat-wage of 75
EUs to solve addition problems for 5 minutes. Notice that subjects do not receive
any marginal benefit for each correctly solved math problem and there are no
consequences for shirking. Nevertheless subjects engaged in production in both
Period 1 and Period 3 attempting an average of 12.75 and 13.94 questions
respectively (effort). Similarly subjects answering an average of 10.30 and 10.81
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questions correctly (effective effort) in Period 1 and Period 3 respectively. Our
study was designed to test if different implementation processes at the outset of
Period 2 affected effort in Period 2, but the additional data gathered in Period 3
are useful for at least 2 reasons. First, they allow for a test of crowding effects
which we examine more thoroughly in Appendix E, but more importantly for the
present analysis, Period 3 provide an additional observation of ability along with
Period 1 data.10 When we try regression specifications that include Period 3 data,
we find that the qualitative results from the previous section do not significantly
change.
Specifically, Regression 1 in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 shown below
reproduce Regression 5 in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. Regression 2 in both tables
includes Period 3 data instead of Period 1 data as a measure of ability, and
Regression 3 in both tables includes both Period 1 and Period 3 data as control
variables.
The results in Tables 2.6 show that the treatment effect of Voting becomes

10

An alternative interpretation of the data collected in Period 3, however, is that they measure the
willingness to provide effort in the absence of any extrinsic incentives-- or their intrinsic motivation for
performing the production task. Notice that at the beginning of Period 1, subjects had no prior
experience with the specific production task used for the duration of the experiment but by Period 3 the
subjects had 10 minutes of experience and they were also told that their compensation would be
identical to the compensation received in Period 1 (a flat-wage payment of 75 EUs). The data in Period
3 further allow us an opportunity to study if the experience of the experiment led to any systematic
increases or decreases in effort. An econometric exercise shown in Appendix E suggests that the
conditions of the experiment did not contribute to any crowding-in or out in Period 3. We do find,
however, that that past success in production contributed to more effective effort in Period 3.
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even stronger when including the Period 3 data than reported in Tables 2.4. All
other co-variates remain largely unchanged with the incorporation of Period 3
data into the regression analysis.
Table 2.6: Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 2
(Period 3 Data)
voting
authority
tournament
tourn_preference
revshar_preference
male
total1
total3
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
0.896*
(0.515)
0.931***
(0.314)
0.788***
(0.264)
-0.641
(0.456)
-0.649
(0.466)
0.626***
(0.241)
0.852***
(0.0456)

(2)
1.752***
(0.587)
0.968**
(0.378)
1.010***
(0.334)
-1.078**
(0.498)
-0.931*
(0.558)
0.416
(0.292)

0.550***
(0.0582)
3.107***
6.131***
(0.614)
(0.728)
270
270
0.695
0.567
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)
1.104**
(0.443)
0.756***
(0.268)
0.766***
(0.253)
-0.839**
(0.381)
-0.663
(0.419)
0.404*
(0.218)
0.632***
(0.0498)
0.258***
(0.0432)
2.490***
(0.639)
270
0.752

It should be noted that Period 1 data and Period 3 data are not statistically
equivalent to one another (see Appendix D). Using two-tailed paired t-tests, we
reject the hypothesis of equivalence of means between Period 3 and Period 1 total
attempted questions (p = 0.01) and also correct answers (p = 0.01). Our data
unfortunately do not allow us to cleanly infer why Period 3 effort was higher than
in Period 1. Perhaps Period 3 effort was higher than Period 1 effort because 1)
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subjects had more practice with the specific production task, or possibly because
2) subjects did not feel any pressure to perform since they were not going to be
paid through an incentive contract.11
Turning now to how the inclusion of Period 3 data affects performance
measured by effective effort, we again notice that the qualitative story does not
change much compared to Table 2.5. In Regression 2 of Table 2.7 we do see a
large increase on the Voting coefficient but when we include both Period 3 and
Period 1 data in Regression 3, we arrive to the same qualitative conclusions as in
Table 2.5. Specifically, after controlling for compensation scheme, ability,
expressed preferences, and gender, groups with endogenous rule creation
performed at significantly higher levels than the control group with exogenous
rule creation.

11

Cognitive psychologists that suggest that pressure reduces the working memory capacity available for
skill execution. For example, an experiment conducted by Beilock and Carr (2005), shows that only
individuals high in working memory capacity were harmed by performance pressure when solving math
problems, and, furthermore, these skill decrements were limited to math problems with the highest
demands on working memory capacity. The authors suggest that that performance pressure harms
individuals most qualiﬁed to succeed by consuming the working memory capacity that they rely on for
their superior performance.
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Table 2.7: Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 2
(Period 3 Data)
voting
authority
tournament
tourn_preference
revshar_preference
male
correct1
correct3
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)
1.095*
(0.588)
1.075***
(0.388)
0.618*
(0.346)
-1.024**
(0.505)
-0.595
(0.535)
0.813**
(0.315)
0.808***
(0.0559)

(2)
1.936***
(0.692)
0.977**
(0.422)
0.536
(0.358)
-1.373**
(0.626)
-1.545**
(0.628)
0.493
(0.333)

0.581***
(0.0540)
2.629***
4.891***
(0.676)
(0.656)
270
270
0.569
0.502
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(3)
1.281**
(0.530)
0.822**
(0.341)
0.451
(0.328)
-1.192***
(0.457)
-0.843*
(0.494)
0.571**
(0.289)
0.562***
(0.0587)
0.319***
(0.0503)
2.052***
(0.644)
270
0.645

2.4.4 Quantile Regression

Our analysis up to now has employed conventional least squares
regression which evaluate the various effects of our covariates on the conditional
mean performance (measured either via total answers, or correct answers) in
Period 2. In order to provide a more complete picture of the covariate effects
across the performance distribution of subjects we also provide estimates of the
conditional quantile regressions shown in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below to illustrate
possible heterogeneous treatment effects. Figure 2.2 shows quantile estimates for
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total effort, and Figure 2.3 for correct answers. All graphs are bounded at the 20 th
and 80th quantiles in both figures because of the relatively small number of
observations in those quantiles. In an effort to be consistent with previous
regression analyses, we summarize quantile regression on the same seven
covariates evaluated in the 5th columns of our linear regression specifications
shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. At any chosen quantile for a given covariate, the
graphs provide point estimates of the impact of a one-unit change of the
covariate on performance in Period 2 at each quantile holding the other
covariates fixed.
While the quantile regressions do not reveal strong evidence suggesting
heterogeneous effects, we do note some potentially interesting and informative
qualitative phenomena. Specifically, the second panel in the first row of both
figures 2.2 and 2.3 shows the effect of being in the Voting treatments for each
performance quantile and this is evidence suggesting that higher performing
subjects in the Voting treatment were more affected by the decision-making
treatment than lower performing subjects. We observe a similar result when
comparing subjects in the tournament with those in the revenue sharing contract
(first panel in the second row of both figures). That is, higher performing
subjects in the tournament contract performed at a higher level than high
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performing subjects in the revenue sharing contract.

Authority
0.00.2 0.40.6 0.81.0

Voting
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50

Total1
0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

Figure 2.2: Quantile Regression Estimates for Total Answers in Period 2
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Effective effort in Figure 2.3 falls off quite sharply for quantiles above .70
but total effort in Figure 2.2 does not. This may indicate that high performing
subjects were trying to maintain a high level of performance to win the
tournament, but were doing so at the cost of quality performance. Indeed a
typical finding in the experimental economics literature shows that the variance
of effort under tournament compensation schemes is usually much higher than
what is theoretically predicted. This particular pattern has been noted in chosen
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effort lab experiments (Bull et al. (1987)), real effort experiments of van Dijk et al.
(2001), and the field experiments conducted in Shearer (2004). The
heterogeneous effects shown in our analysis do not offer much of an explanation
for why there is high variation in tournament schemes, but they do suggest some
hypotheses that could be tested with a different design. For example, it may be
that high-performers become reckless in tournaments and low performers,
knowing that they are relatively weaker are not much affected by tournament
schemes relative to say, piece-rates.

Authority
0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20

0.80

Voting
-1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00

Correct1
0.85
0.90

Figure 2.3: Quantile Regression Estimates for Correct Answers in Period 2
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Finally, when we compare the corresponding performances in Period 2 by
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gender, we observe that at all quantiles, men performed at a higher level than
women given the specification of the other conditioning variables in both Figure
2.2. and Figure 2.3.
2.5 Conclusion

With few exceptions, the economics literature has overlooked how
procedural aspects in the determination of rules and institutions affect behavior.
We've shown that participants in a real-effort laboratory experiment subjected to
an identical set of wage incentives either implemented (1) endogenously by the
group to which subjects belong through a simple majority vote, (2) endogenously
by only one member of the group who had all decision-control rights, or (3) a
random process completely exogenous to the group, systematically performed at
different levels even after controlling for gender, the ability to voice a preference
for a compensation scheme, and a measure of demonstrated ability. Specifically,
we found strong statistical evidence that different levels of effort were provided
under endogenous imposition schemes relative to the random exogenous
processes. These findings are robust to alternative regression specifications that
include two separate measures of ability. Furthermore, quantile regression
analysis showed that some of these treatment effects were heterogeneous across
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the performance distribution with higher performing subjects in the Voting
treatment more affected by 'voting' than low performing subjects in the same
treatment, relative to the Control.
By showing that the process by which a material incentive was
implemented partially explains differences in performance, we add further
credence to recent claims in economics (and well established claims in many
related social sciences) that procedural aspects cannot be separated from how
individuals interpret material incentives (e.g. Frey and Stutzer (2004)). This
research raises many more questions than provides definite answers. To what do
we attribute the differences in the interpretation of incentives that are materially
identical? Would we expect to observe similar results if the decision-maker in
the Authority treatment was determined by a non-random process? Does the
process of implementation matter more or less if subjects were given a different
effort task, or given the opportunity to select out of the effort task? While much
is left unresolved, we believe that the issues we touch upon in this paper are ripe
for further exploration.
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CHAPTER 3
THE RELATIVE EFFECT OF EMPLOYEE VOICE, AUTONOMY,
AND WAGES ON JOB SATISFACTION
3.1 Introduction
In the following paper we analyze the relative effects of voice, autonomy,
and wages in explaining job satisfaction. While job satisfaction has been
identified as an important economic variable because of its association with
lower absenteeism, (Wegge et al., (2007)) quits, (e.g. Freeman, 1978), and positive
association with work behavior that extends beyond perfunctory standards
(Organ and Ryan, (1995)), job satisfaction is still a relatively “new” subject of
interest within Economics. By contrast, in both Organizational Behavior and
Management Studies job satisfaction is one of the most investigated variables
(Cranny et al. 1992, Spector 1997). Daniel Hamermesh (2004) likens the recent
uptick in the interest of satisfaction studies in economics as partly a function of
the “Mt. Everest phenomenon” or the mountain of extensive, potentially
interesting, attitudinal data that should be explored.12 The increase in behavioral
considerations within economics, however, has also contributed to a general
12

For examples of seminal papers by economists on job satisfaction as an economic variable, See
Hamermesh (1977) and Freeman (1978). Frey and Stutzer (2002) provides an excellent review of
subjective evaluation studies for questions economists are traditionally study.
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expansion of the scope of questions that are studied by economists – including
job satisfaction. This new trend has affected the framework of analysis. The
rational choice model (RCM) has been central in traditional economic evaluations
of personnel and human resources issues in the firm (e.g. incentives,
compensation, and job search) but it is increasingly recognized that the RCM
may have several shortcomings.
First, within the RCM all agents are assumed to act in the pursuit of their
own private interest which has led to the ubiquitous assumption that utility
maximizing workers conceptualize 'work' as a private cost and will therefore
have a natural tendency to shirk. We know, however, that workers draw upon
their employment as a source of utility through various avenues – including the
social interaction they have with co-workers, feelings of accomplishment, the
associated social status of work, or simply from performing the work task itself
(Frey and Stutzer (2002)). Both Lane (1991) and Juster (1991), furthermore, find
that most people rate 'satisfying work' as more important to explaining personal
happiness than income, material possessions, and most forms of leisure. Other
studies show that the psychic costs endured during a of a spell of unemployment
typically include anxiety, loss in self-esteem, and depression (e.g. Argyle, 1989).
Second, within the RCM it is assumed that 1) preferences are revealed
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through choices, 2) the revealed preferences are those that maximize utility, and
3) preferences are consistent through all points in time (Read, (2007)). Hundreds
of studies, however, show that humans often 'reveal choices' that would be
inconsistent with utility maximization within the RCM. For example, we know
that 'real-world' individuals use cognitive heuristics that can lead to systematic
errors when evaluating probabilistic events (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)),
they regularly demonstrate time-inconsistent preferences, (e.g. Thaler, (1981),
Laibson, (1997)), and that the hedonic effect of favorable and unfavorable
circumstances adjusts through time (e.g. Frederick and Loewenstein (1999)). In
consideration of these and other behavioral issues that conflict with the RCM
framework, Daniel Kahneman (e.g. Kahneman et al. (1997), Kahneman et al.,
(1999), Kahneman and Sugden, (2005)), and others have advocated for the use of
experience utility – or the utility as gained through experiencing a set of
circumstances that one lives through, in addition to decision utility – or the utility
gained when revealing exogenously given preferences, to evaluate outcomes.
Consistent with the concept of experience utility, we conceptualize self-reported
levels of job satisfaction as a reflection of an attitude that a worker has in
consideration of their job characteristics after having gained some experience
with their work. In particular, we investigate the relative impact of job
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characteristics that allow workers autonomy and voice using subjective
evaluations of work conditions and satisfaction recorded in the 2004 wave of the
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS).
The 2004 WERS includes a variety of questions that depict attitudinal and
subjective evaluations by workers of managers, other employees, and third party
employee representatives, over a variety of employment relations issues. Some
financial data on the firm, including employee wages are also provided, and we
use data on wages in addition to employees' subjective evaluation over the ability
to control their own work and to influence firm level policy and organization. 13
We also draw upon data that has been made linkable to the 2004 WERS that
provides selected characteristics of the local geographic area that the firm is
located in, such as the local unemployment rate.
Using survey responses, we find that the wage is positively correlated
with job satisfaction; but when measures of worker autonomy and voice are
13

Subjective evaluation surveys, while are not without 'noise' that can arise from various factors (i.e.
mood bias, response biases) offer the most widely used approach for studying satisfaction and are the
method that we employ. (See Frey and Stutzer (2002) for a general review subjective evaluation studies
in economics. Kahneman and Sugden (2005) do discuss potential alternatives to measuring experience
utility that have been used including the experience sampling methodology where each subject is asked
to carry a device that beeps at random times during the day, at which time the subject is asked to
respond to questions regarding her current situation and affective state. They also describe the day
reconstruction method where subjects are asked to think about their previous day, decompose it into
short ‘episodes’ such as ‘having dinner’ or ‘traveling to the gym’ and then, for each episode, to note if
she was interacting with anyone and to describe how her affective state (for example, ‘happy’, ‘enjoying
myself’, ‘frustrated/annoyed’, ‘worried/ anxious’). The day reconstruction method is thought to reduce
the vulnerability of subjective measurements that might arise due to focusing illusions – or the tendency
to exaggerate the importance of the current focus of one’s attention, because it does not prompt people
to think about particular sources of happiness or unhappiness. Instead, respondents evaluate the overall
affective experience of different episodes, whose boundaries they define for themselves.
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included in the satisfaction regression, the magnitude of the coefficient on the
wage decreases by a factor of 3. The elasticity of satisfaction with respect to
autonomy and voice, respectively, is 12 to 15 times larger than the elasticity with
respect to the wage. The inclusion of autonomy and voice further causes a spike
in explaining the proportion of variability of job satisfaction. For instance, the
Adjusted R2 spikes from 0.093 to 0.476 when including measures of autonomy
and voice (F-tests comparing specifications significantly differ at the 0.01 level).
Thus, autonomy and voice both appear to trump the wage in determining job
satisfaction. We conclude that, conditional upon having a job, the amount of
control a worker has is an important determinant of job satisfaction.14 Our
findings suggest that while wages are an important determinant of which job an
individual would select into, it is not the most important determinant of job
satisfaction (experience utility); particularly when compared to autonomy and
employee voice.

3.2 Background

14

This is cross-section data and occupation fixed effects are used. All identification comes from variation
across existing workers in a given occuaption
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3.2.1 Employee voice and autonomy
In a general sense, employee voice refers to the idea that workers can
express their interests and concerns over firm matters to management in a
meaningful manner. The precise meaning of the term, however, and the
rationale for its application varies along different economic, moral, and
pragmatic dimensions.15 For example, Hirshman (1970) conceptualizes 'voice' in
a firm as employee access to grievance procedures, while others expand on the
term for it to refer to the level of influence employees have in development of all
firm rules and policies ranging from payment, to work schedules, investment
decisions, and production processes (e.g. McCabe and Lewin (1992); Huselid
(1995)). Although collective bargaining and/or trade unionism have historically
been the primary mechanisms for the representation of worker interests,
initiatives designed to increase employee involvement have increasingly featured
in the prescriptive management literature for both unionized and nonunion
workers over the past 50 years.16
Similarly, the literature on worker autonomy contains many definitions
15

16

Dundon et al. (2004) provide an excellent taxonomic scheme of how voice has been conceptualized in
different literatures.
This is particularly true in Europe where nonunion workers can legitimately have formal voice
regarding their working conditions supported by the EU Directives on European Works Councils
(EWCs) and Employee Information and Consultation. While many petitions and political movements
supportive of similar legislation exist in the U.S. such as the Workplace Bill of Right campaign
(http://www.workplacefairness.org/workplace-bill-of-rights ) similar legislation has yet to be introduced
in the U.S. Bowles and Gintis (1996) further comment on the notion that democratic processes within
firms are not redundant within a liberal democratic polity.
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and interpretations of the precise meaning of the term. While some definitions
are used to interpret potential influences on the worker's work practice, others
are used to guide research about the organizational features of the firm. For the
purposes of the research conducted herein, and in conjunction with the 2004
WERS, we define autonomy as the ability of a worker to use her own knowledge
to make decisions that directly affect her work.

3.2.2 Prescriptive Human Resource Management

The prescriptive management and organizational behavior literature is
full of superlative hypotheses describing virtuous cascades that follow from
providing workers with more autonomy and voice, including higher job
satisfaction. The empirical record on these issues is at least as old as scientific
management, but most studies have been restricted to case studies on a small
number of firms. The quality and extent of large-scale micro attitudinal data on
the topic are a recent phenomenon. The bulk of studies on voice and autonomy,
moreover, focus on the effects of specific organizational mechanisms (such as
joint consultation or works councils) on job satisfaction. While there is surely
overlap between employee voice, autonomy, and the firm policies designed to
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foster them, we instead use workers' subjective evaluation of the level of voice
and autonomy that they have in the firm. This approach allows us to engage
with the issues of voice and autonomy on general terms rather than focusing on
any specific management or human resources paradigm. 17

3.2.3 Similar Attitudinal Data

The emergence of large micro data sets linking individuals to particular
types of work organization structures is recent. Appelbaum et al. (2000) survey
workers in apparel, steel, medical electronics, and imaging industries in the U.S.
finding that “high-performance workplace practices” that introduce work teams
and rely more on participatory decision-making have many virtuous effects.
They report increases in workers' trust in their managers, higher intrinsic
motivation, increases in job satisfaction, and also in organizational commitment.
They further find that the added responsibility that comes with these
organizational structures does not negatively affect workers' stress. In general,

17

While not entirely intractable, the management literature offers various prescriptive frameworks that
overlap significantly with respect to management practices. For example, one can find significant
literatures on Strategic Human Resource Management (SHRM), Human Resource Management (HRM),
High Commitment Management (HCM), High Performance Management (HPM), High Involvement
Management (HIM), High Performance Workplace Practices (HPWP), High Performance Work
Systems (WPWS), High Involvement Work Design (HIWD), Total Quality Management (TQM) among
(many) others that are different, yet al.l make claims over the importance of advancing employee voice
and autonomy.
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the positive effects of participation and work teams on job satisfaction are
corroborated in the analysis of the U.S. based Workplace Representation and
Participation Survey (WRPS) reported in Freeman and Rogers (1999), and
Freeman and Kleiner (2000), the European Survey on Working Conditions
(ESWC) as reported in Bauer (2004), data collected by the Institute of Work
Psychology reported in Stride et al. (2007), and also in many firm level case
studies (e.g. Lawler and Hall; (1970); (Bjork et al. 2007). A survey conducted in
Godard (2001), however, suggests increasing levels of participatory workplace
strategies can weaken and in some cases decrease job satisfaction because of new
pressures and responsibilities that accompany participation. Similar findings
have been reported in Batt and Applelbaum (1995), Graham (1995), and Lewchuk
and Robertson (1997). 18
Our own study is similar to Wood (2008) because of the use of subjective
evaluation data measuring voice and satisfaction taken from the 2004 wave of the
Workplace Employee Relations Survey. The emphasis of Wood's piece is in
showing the importance of job characteristics for researchers interested in
analyzing job satisfaction. Our study, by contrast investigates the relative effects
of voice and autonomy, compared to the wage in explaining job satisfaction.
18

For example, see the edited volume by Freeman, Boxall, and Haynes (2007) for descriptive summaries
of various attitudinal surveys that build upon survey work conducted in Freeman and Rogers (1999).
Studies from data collected from the WPRS, BWRPS, AWRPS, NZWRPS, NCPP/ESRI/UCD, CanadaU.S. Labor Attitudes Survey, and WERS are presented.
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Economists are relatively new to studying job satisfaction, and have
largely ignored the importance of job characteristics. To be fair, Lazear (1996)
mentions that economists have dealt with the study of job characteristics that
operate outside of the price system “quite easily” by transforming nonpecuniary
components of the job into their monetary equivalents by equalizing differences
or “compensating differentials” (e.g. Rosen 1974). Lazear, however, is quick to
point out the “fundamental identification problem” that occurs if workers with
exogenous preferences sort according to ability, making it difficult to pick up the
trade-off between wages and job characteristics independent of ability. Of
course, the theory of compensating differentials is rooted in the RCM, which, as
we have illustrated above, may be problematic in and of itself.

3.3 Data

The data come from the worker, management, and geographic files of the
2004 wave of the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) sponsored and
collected by the Department of Trade and Industry, ACAS, the Economic and
Social Research Council, and the Policy Studies Studies Institute. The WERS
survey is a nationally representative, stratified, random-sample of United
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Kingdom workplaces with at least 10 employees. The survey samples no more
than 25 employees from a given firm and there are approximately 2300
workplaces and 22,500 employees in the 2004 WERS.
The final subsample of the data set used here contains 15,547 observations.
There are two main sources of missing observations. The first source is unusable
responses to questions about earnings, where an unusable response is either a
non-response or one where the worker did not know her income. The second
main source is non-responses to questions about the various aspects of worker
autonomy and voice.

3.4 Methodology

Autonomy is a measure of the worker's ability to control her own job, and
voice is a measure of the ability of a worker to influence the firm as a whole via
communication with management. The questions regarding satisfaction,
autonomy, voice, effort, and job security are all coded according to a Likert scale
with 1 being ``strongly disagree'' and 5 ``strongly agree.'' Thus, higher numbers
mean greater satisfaction, greater autonomy, greater voice, and greater job
security, respectively.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of Key Variables
Statistic
Satisfaction Autonomy
Voice Wage
Mean
24.46
14.97
12.26
10.42
Std. Dev
(4.88)
(3.65)
(3.91)
(5.77)
Source: Authors' calculations based on the 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey.
Notes: Index of autonomy is the sum of 5 aspects of workplace autonomy, and varies
between 5 and 25. Index of satisfaction is the sum of seven aspects of job satisfaction,
and varies between 7 and 35. The wage is calculated by taking usual weekly income and
dividing it by usual weekly work hours.

Table 3.1 contains summary statistics of the four key variables: job
satisfaction, autonomy, voice, and the wage. Except for the wage, the key
variables are all captured by multiple questions in the WERS survey. We
combined the respective questions on satisfaction, voice, and autonomy into
indexes. These indexes represent the overall level of satisfaction, voice, and
autonomy that workers report having in the workplace. The three indexes are
constructed through summation of the responses to the relevant questions. 19
There are seven questions on job satisfaction covering satisfaction with
achievement, initiative, influence, training, pay, job security, and the work itself.
The survey covers five aspects of autonomy: control over the tasks to be
completed, the pace tasks are completed, how tasks are to be completed, the

19

The results of a PCA on the 7 satisfaction questions suggested 6 orthogonal components. We therefore
found it reasonable to construct an index using simple summation. In subsequent analysis, we took the
logs of all variables for comparison of coefficients without units.
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order in which tasks are completed, and daily start and/or stop time. Finally,
there are four aspects of voice: the extent to which management solicits views
from workers, how responsive management is to the suggestions of employees,
how good managers are at letting employees and/or employee representatives
influence final decisions, and overall satisfaction with the amount of employee
involvement there is in workplace decision making. The precise questions used
are listed in Appendix F. The three indexes--job satisfaction, autonomy and
voice--vary between 7 and 35, 5 and 25, and 4 and 20, respectively.
The primary justification for using indexes constructed in this manner is
simplicity for both presentation and interpretation of the results. There is,
however, an important conceptual justification for the indexes, particularly the
index of job satisfaction. The questions covering job satisfaction are intended to
cover aspects of satisfaction that can vary independently of each other to paint
more complete picture of job satisfaction. We find it reasonable to think of the
sum of the seven aspects as representing overall satisfaction. Of course, for a
given level of overall job satisfaction, this construction obscures important
variation across individuals.
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Figure 3.1: Plot of Overall Satisfaction over Autonomy
Source: Authors' calculations based on the 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey.

Notes: Index of autonomy is the sum of 5 aspects of workplace autonomy, and varies
between 5 and 25. Index of satisfaction is the sum of seven aspects of job satisfaction,
and varies between 7 and 35.

Figure 3.2: Plot of Overall Satisfaction over Voice
Source: Authors' calculations based on the 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey.

Notes: Index of voice is the sum of four aspects of voice, and varies between 4 and 20.
Index of satisfaction is the sum of seven aspects of job satisfaction, and varies between 7
and 35.
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The central hypothesis that job satisfaction increases with the amount of
autonomy and voice a worker has over the workplace is illustrated in Figures 3.1
and Figure 3.2. There is a strong positive correlation between satisfaction and
both autonomy and voice, respectively. Consistent with Wood (2008), the figures
demonstrate the importance of the relationship between these two job attributes
and job satisfaction. However, there are likely important correlates of job
satisfaction that could reduce or eliminate the correlation between job
satisfaction and voice and autonomy, respectively. Most importantly, jobs with
more autonomy likely pay more, implying that the strong positive correlation
between job satisfaction and autonomy is picking up the effect of the wage as
well as autonomy itself. In the following section we investigate this issue further
with regression analysis.

3.5 Estimation Results

The regression results can be found in Table 3.2. The key variables of the
analysis are the wage, the index of autonomy, and the index of voice. The
remaining control variables, common to all regressions include usual weekly
work hours, and dummies for begin a supervisor, a union member, female,
59

married, a permanent employee, and a full-time employee. All regressions also
contain categorical variables for age, education, tenure, and race, as well as a set
of occupation dummies. All regressions are Log-OLS regressions, where the
dependent variable is the index of job satisfaction. 20 Standard errors are clustered
on the firm.

20

Because of how the index is constructed, there is some clustering at the extreme values. The results are
robust to estimation with Tobit rather than OLS.

60

Table 3.2: Regression of Job Satisfaction on the Wage, Voice, and Autonomy
log wage
log autonomy

(1)
0.050***
(0.007)

0.068***
(0.005)

(2)
0.022***
(0.005)
0.229***
(0.008)
0.307***
(0.006)
0.014***
(0.004)

-0.050***
(0.006)
0.040***
(0.005)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.011**
(0.005)
0.029***
(0.009)
-0.057***
(0.009)

-0.018***
(0.004)
0.021***
(0.004)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.007**
(0.004)
0.030***
(0.007)
-0.046***
(0.007)

log voice
supervisor
supervisor x wage

(3)
(4)
0.036*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.006)
0.350***
(0.010)
0.356***
(0.007)
0.031*** 0.034***
(0.004)
(0.004)

supervisor x autonomy
supervisor x voice
union
female
hours
married
permanent
fulltime
Age
22-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-65
> 65
Tenure
1-2 years
2-5 years
5-10 years
>= 10 years
Education
College degree
Advanced degree
Constant
N
Adj R2

-0.025***
(0.004)
0.026***
(0.004)
0.002***
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.004)
0.025***
(0.007)
-0.044***
(0.008)

-0.034***
(0.006)
0.031***
(0.005)
0.001***
(0.000)
0.005
(0.005)
0.035***
(0.008)
-0.057***
(0.008)

(5)
(6)
0.019***
(0.006)
0.215***
0.232***
(0.009)
(0.008)
0.319***
0.307***
(0.008)
(0.006)
-0.075
0.017***
(0.056)
(0.004)
0.008
(0.008)
0.063***
(0.019)
-0.041***
(0.012)
-0.017*** -0.017***
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.022*** 0.018***
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000)
(0.000)
0.007**
0.008**
(0.004)
(0.004)
0.030*** 0.030***
(0.007)
(0.007)
-0.045*** -0.042***
(0.007)
(0.007)

-0.026** -0.020** -0.021** -0.024**
(0.011)
(0.009) (0.009)
(0.010)
-0.031*** -0.021** -0.017*
-0.034***
(0.011)
(0.009) (0.009)
(0.011)
-0.034*** -0.024** -0.021** -0.035***
(0.011)
(0.009) (0.009)
(0.011)
-0.011
-0.007
-0.003
-0.016
(0.012)
(0.010) (0.010)
(0.011)
0.060*** 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.040***
(0.014)
(0.012) (0.012)
(0.013)
0.140*** 0.054*** 0.082*** 0.086***
(0.024)
(0.016) (0.018)
(0.021)

-0.019**
(0.009)
-0.019**
(0.009)
-0.023**
(0.009)
-0.006
(0.010)
0.045***
(0.012)
0.055***
(0.017)

-0.017**
(0.009)
-0.015
(0.009)
-0.018*
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.009)
0.048***
(0.012)
0.056***
(0.017)

-0.029***
(0.009)
-0.045***
(0.008)
-0.039***
(0.008)
-0.047***
(0.008)

-0.029***
(0.008)
-0.046***
(0.007)
-0.043***
(0.008)
-0.054***
(0.008)

0.001
(0.006)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.003
(0.006)
-0.005
(0.006)

-0.000
(0.006)
-0.005
(0.005)
0.002
(0.006)
-0.004
(0.006)

-0.034***
(0.006)
-0.040***
(0.009)
2.210***
(0.041)
15650
0.261

-0.027***
(0.005)
-0.020***
(0.007)
1.740***
(0.040)
15650
0.478

-0.023***
(0.004)
-0.012*
(0.007)
1.762***
(0.036)
15650
0.475

-0.000
(0.006)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.001
(0.006)
-0.006
(0.006)

0.004
(0.006)
0.001
(0.006)
0.010
(0.007)
0.007
(0.006)

-0.036*** -0.027*** -0.027***
(0.006)
(0.005) (0.005)
-0.035*** -0.018*** -0.011
(0.010)
(0.007) (0.007)
3.037*** 1.729*** 2.148***
(0.037)
(0.036) (0.034)
15650
15650
15650
0.093
0.476
0.410

Notes: Data from the 2004 W ERS. Sig asterisks: *10%, **5%, & ***1%. All regressions include race and occupation dummies.

61

Regression 1 in Table 3.2 contains the baseline results and, consistent with
standard economic intuition, the wage is strongly positively correlated with job
satisfaction. The estimated coefficient implies that a 10% increase in the wage is
associated with an 0.5% increase in job satisfaction. For the present purposes,
one other coefficient is worth noting: being a supervisor is strongly positively
correlated with job satisfaction.
The problem with this baseline specification is that, besides occupation
dummies and the wage, it makes no attempt to control employee voice or
autonomy. Regression 2 in Table 3.2 reports the results of a regression with the
addition of the indexes of autonomy and voice. There are a number of important
changes when voice and autonomy are included.
First, the estimated coefficient on the wage decreases by about 50%.
Although the coefficient is still positive and significant, it now implies that a 10%
increase in the wage results in only a 0.22% increase in job satisfaction.
Considerably smaller than the 0.5% increase in Regression 1. Second, the
estimated coefficients on autonomy and voice are both positive and significant,
and are 12 and 14 times larger than the coefficient on the wage, respectively. A
10% increase in autonomy is associated with a 2.3% increase in satisfaction, while
10% increase in voice is associated with a 3% increase in satisfaction. Notice also
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that the Adjusted R2, measuring the proportion of variability in the data
accounted for by the regression model increases from 0.093 in Regression 1 to
0.476 in Regression 2. The results of a Wald test comparing equivalence of
models 1 and 2 is rejected at the 0.01 level (Prob > F = 0.0000). This finding is
robust to likelihood-ratio tests (Prob > χ² =

0.0000). F-tests across coefficients

reject the joint hypothesis that autonomy and voice are zero (Prob > F =
and the hypothesis that the wage is equal to zero (Prob > F =

0.0000)

0.0001).

Based on the results in Regressions 1 and 2 from Table 3.2 two conclusions
can be drawn: the wage, voice, and autonomy are all important correlates of job
satisfaction, and, voice and autonomy are an order of magnitude stronger
correlates of job satisfaction than the wage. However, as is clear from the
preceding discussion, there are a number of estimated coefficients that are not
robust to the inclusion of autonomy and voice. This raises important questions
about the nature of the correlation between voice and/or autonomy, and the other
variables in the regressions.
The estimated coefficients on the wage, supervisor, union, tenure, and
education all see changes of at least 50% when voice and autonomy are included.
And, in every case, the movement is towards zero. For the present purposes, the
most pertinent changes are on the wage and on being a supervisor. We will deal
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with each in turn. The changes in the remaining coefficients are certainly
interesting, as it suggests the over-arching importance of voice and autonomy in
shaping job satisfaction, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
Regressions 3 and 4 help understand what is driving the large change in
the coefficients on the wage and the supervisor dummy, respectively. Regression
3 includes only autonomy and the wage, excluding voice. The bulk of the
decrease in the coefficient on the wage is due to the inclusion of autonomy alone,
reflecting a positive correlation between the wage and autonomy. An auxiliary
regression supports this claim, thought the results are not reported here. In a
regression of the wage on the same set of controls used in the satisfaction
regression, the coefficient on autonomy is statistically significant and positive.
The specific reasons for this correlation are not important. What is important,
and will be discussed in more detail below, is the fact that autonomy and the
wage move together.21
Regression 4 includes only the wage and voice, excluding autonomy.
Voice also has important effects on the estimated coefficients on the wage and
being a supervisor. With only voice, the coefficient on the wage is smaller,
21

There are two likely candidates as explanations for this correlation. The first is a ``good jobs'' effect.
Some firms simply offer their workers higher wages and more autonomy, and workers with these types
of employments report higher satisfaction. Alternatively, principal-agent models of worker motivation
also imply that the wage and autonomy should be positively correlated (e.g. Bowles and Gintis, (1985),
Alchian and Demsetz, (1972), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Guy and Skott (2007)).
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though not nearly as small as with autonomy. This suggests a small positive
correlation between voice and the wage, though in results not reported here it is
found that this correlation is not statistically significant.
Voice and autonomy have almost equal impacts on the coefficient for
being a supervisor, highlighting a potential pitfall with the estimation. Given
that voice and autonomy are, by definition, higher for supervisors, it could be
possible that supervisors are driving the results for autonomy and voice in
Regression 2. If it were true that workers who put a higher value on voice and
autonomy are more likely to be supervisors, we would expect that supervisors
should exhibit higher levels of job satisfaction than non-supervisors before
controlling for voice and autonomy. Further, when voice and autonomy are
controlled for, the value that supervisors place on voice and/or autonomy should
be higher than non-supervisors, and the difference in average job satisfaction
between supervisors and non-supervisors should be smaller.
Regression 5 of Table 2 reports the results of a regression identical to
Regression 2, with the addition of three interaction terms. The results are quite
striking. First, with the inclusion of the interactions, the coefficient on the
supervisor dummy becomes negative and insignificant. There is no average
difference in job satisfaction between supervisors and non-supervisors. Second,
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the direct effects of autonomy and voice, respectively, are statistically identical to
those reported in Regression 2. Finally, the interaction between autonomy and
the supervisor dummy is positive and significant, while the interaction with
voice is negative and significant.
The stability of the direct effects of autonomy and voice is important
because it demonstrates that the positive correlations between autonomy and
satisfaction, and autonomy and voice are not driven by differences between
supervisors and non-supervisors.

3.6 Discussion of Results

Before discussing the broader implications of the results, a brief summary
is warranted. It is found that, without including measures of autonomy and
voice as regressors, job satisfaction has a statistically significant positive
correlation with the wage level. However, there are many aspects of firm
organization that could shape job satisfaction that are omitted from this
regression. Specifically, when indexes of autonomy and voice, respectively, are
included in the satisfaction regression, the correlation between the wage and
satisfaction decreases by roughly 50%, but remains positive and significant.
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Further, the elasticities of satisfaction with respect to voice and autonomy,
respectively, are 12 to 15 times large than the elasticity with respect to the wage.
Most importantly, the proportion of variation of satisfaction explained by the
inclusion of autonomy and voice into the regression specification (Regression 2
vs Regression 1 in Table 2) shows much higher precision. Standard ANOVA Ftests comparing models support this claim. The amount of autonomy and voice
that a worker has over the firm is an important omitted variable, biasing the
estimated coefficient on the wage upwards. And, conditional upon having a job,
voice and autonomy are considerably more important determinants of job
satisfaction than the wage. Our results are consistent with similar empirical
studies, including Bartling, Fehr, and Schmidt (2009), and complement Dube and
Freeman (2008), where it is found that revenue-sharing payment schemes only
improve worker productivity when workers also have influence over their
workplace.
By showing that autonomy and voice result in such large changes in the
proportion of variation of satisfaction, our identification strategy suggests as
strong causal relationship. Note, however, that one may argue that there is a
problem of reverse causality between tenure and satisfaction. We should be clear
that we are not interested in precisely establishing causality here. For us, what
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really matters is that the association between satisfaction and tenure is consistent
with evidence from the literature. We find this to be the case. For example,
Freeman (1978) reports that job tenure has “virtually no effect on job
satisfaction,” but is associated with much lower quit rates. All reported
regression specifications with our voice index are consistent with this finding. It
may be then that when people have voice, tenure does not matter, and when
people do not have voice, they tenure is negatively associated with satisfaction.

3.7 Conclusion

The results leave open the reasons why satisfaction is so influenced by job
characteristics that support worker autonomy and voice. The behavioral
program of study initiated by Deci (1971), which may contribute to an
explanation, evaluates the interaction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivators.
In short, self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan, (1985), Deci and Ryan
(2000a), and Deci and Ryan (2000b) suggests that the effect of an external
intervention can support or thwart satisfaction depending on how the extrinsic
institution affects the sense of (1) autonomy, or the desire to self-organize own
actions and for their actions to be causal, (2) competence, or the desire to feel
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capable of affecting surroundings, or (3) relatedness, or the desire to feel
connected to and respected by a social group. Extrinsic incentives can crowd out
satisfaction if they are perceived as controlling, but conversely can crowd in
satisfaction if perceived as supportive of one's psychological needs. Selfdetermination theory explains our findings quite well as both increases in worker
autonomy and voice support one's sense of autonomy, competence, and
relatedness in intuitive ways.
Based on the experienced utility of the employed, job-seekers would do
themselves a favor by trying to obtain jobs that will give them more voice and
autonomy since they will likely find them satisfying. We've shown that the wage
earned is important for job satisfaction, but it should not be given much weight
compared to voice and autonomy. A natural extension of our study would
investigate how much weight job-seekers give to the wage, voice, and autonomy
during their search. If it were true that job-seekers only consider wage
characteristics, they run the risk of being unsatisfied with their job. Alternatively,
if job-seekers do indeed make good forecast, economists will have to re-think the
traditional assumptions that wages drive search behavior commonly made in
models of employee search and matching.
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CHAPTER 4

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CONSIDERATION OF BEHAVIORAL
AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
“[J]ust 15 years ago, research on incentives in organizations consisted to a disappointingly large extent of
(a) identifying a ‘paradoxical’ feature of some internal labor market (for example, academic tenure, or pay
raises based purely on seniority), then (b) crafting a theoretical model showing how that feature was in fact
an efficient response to some contracting problem. Most analyses stopped there.”-- Charness and Kuhn
(2010)

4.1 Introduction
The identification of facilities and circumstances that motivate labor has
been, and remains, of central academic and practical significance. Many
“rigorous and analytic” (Lazear, 1996) models of motivation have been
developed by economists, but the vast majority are (1) rooted in the rational
choice model (RCM) where all agents are assumed to be both rational and solely
motivated by their own private material interest, and (2) entirely without context,
thereby eliminating the potential role of complementary institutions supportive
of a motivational framework. When, do these caveats hold? Or more to the
point, how well do theories of motivation rooted in the RCM predict employee
performance?
To investigate these issues, one would ideally compare firms selected at
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random that only differ in one salient, structural dimension. The 'real-world,'
unfortunately, does not produce these data. Further, when using firm-level data,
it is impossible to fully control for all firm characteristics and processes when
trying to isolate causal relationships of interest. The appeal of using controlled
experimental techniques is precisely because of the ability to mitigate many of
these issues and better focus on the precise question of interest. Although still a
relatively new research methodology, experiments in economics have helped
influence many aspects within the broader economics discipline. 22 Some of the
major contributions might be crudely summarized in the following three ways. 23
First, experiments in economics have illustrated that the RCM predicts
real-world behavior in some settings-- such as those in competitive experimental

22

23

One example that supports this claim can be taken from the recently 2009 ISI Journal Citation Reports
where the The journal Experimental Economics was rated as having an the 10th largest impact factor
(measuring the average number of citations to articles published in science and social science journals)
out of 245 economics journals evaluated.
It is well known, however, that subjects that participate in an economics experiment might misrepresent
their own wants and desires due to any number of biases (i.e. trying to impress the experimenter or
other subjects) that threaten both the internal and external validity of the experiment, thereby making
inferences made from the data unreliable. Some threats to the internal validity of a project include a
decision task for subjects that is not salient and non-random sampling of subjects. As an ideal
robustness check, the results and evidence found from a specific experimental protocol should be
repeated under the same set of controls more than once. Falk and Fehr (2003) suggests that external
validity for an experiment may hinge upon whether the relevant conditions in the experiment parallel
those in the real-world, and second, whether or not behavioral regularities observed in the lab persist in
new situations when the relevant underlying conditions remain substantially unchanged. That is, if an
experiment implements certain conditions that generate robust and replicable regularities, Falk and Fehr
(2003) argue that we can inductively reason that the same behavioral regularities are likely to occur
under similar conditions that would put an individual in the same cognitive state. Indeed, a major
application of experiments has been precisely to 'testbed' mechanisms and policies that have either not
been implemented in the real-world, or the data needed to test such policies are difficult to obtain –
including many incentive schemes and governance facilities thought to influence the level of worker
productivity as will become apparent below.
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markets or in the presence of arbitrage -- and miserably in others -- such as in
ultimatum or trust games. That is, rationality and self-interest are now
commonly interpreted as contextually dependent behaviors. For example, Smith
(1991), Chu and Chu (1990) and later Cherry et al. (2003), Brown et al. (2004),
Henrich et al. (2001), Carpenter (2005), and Hoffman et al. (1994) all show that in
the context of markets and market-like institutions, we typically observe
behaviors that are very consistent with the assumptions in the RCM framework.
A common point of emphasis among these studies is that complete market
institutions support a very specific and well defined set of behaviors that appear
to be self-serving and rational.
Second, experiments have illuminated a number of cases where deviations
from the RCM are systematic, common, and replicable. Robust behavioral
tendencies in controlled settings have already led to the emergence of many
influential theories in Economics. For example, scores of findings from
experiments conducted by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky throughout the
1970's and 1980's led to the development of Prospect Theory. More recently, the
lab experiments have repeatedly helped show that many individuals have strong
preferences for the material well-being of others leading to the development of
utilitarian models of other-regarding and social preferences (e.g. Fehr and
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Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), or Charness and Rabin (2002)).
Third, experimental economics has produced specific examples of how
cultural norms influence individual behavior. Where economists are trained to
only consider the role of relative prices in guiding behavior, experiments have
helped give estimates over how much social instruments such as communication
(e.g. Sally (1995)), social sanction (e.g. Ostrom et al.(1994), Masclet et al. (2003),
and social reward Carpenter and Seki (2005)) influence individual behavior.
In the following chapter we review (mostly) experimental economic work
that has evaluated personnel models of motivation. In Section 1 we review the
behavioral effect of different incentive contracts; in Section 2, we review studies
that evaluate the role of general labor market conditions on worker behavior; in
Section 3 we examine some experimental work on the role of loyalty, job
satisfaction, and intrinsic motivation, and in Section 4, we review work that
examines the motivational effect of different firm governance structures. In the
final section, we conclude.

4.2. Incentive contracts
Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler (1990) suggest that incentive contracts can be
defined as payment schemes that link pay to either individual or group output.
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In the following section, we present a summary of reported behaviors from
controlled experiments of different compensation schemes that have been
evaluated in the lab.

4.2.1 Piece-rates

Piece-rates are incentive contracts that guarantee a pre-determined level of
payment for each unit of output produced. For all practical purposes, piece-rate
contracts are non-strategic, utility-maximization problems. The benefits of
production are well defined and the costs are private and unique to each
employee. In theory, piece-rates shift all risks, costs, and benefits of labor onto
employees after the commission rate is chosen by the employers. In a traditional
game-theoretic framework, the price-rate is found by solving for the optimal rate,
given the best-response of the employee. When we assume a linear production
function, full-information in production, zero uncertainty, and know the riskpreferences of workers, finding the optimal piece-rate that would motivate labor
is a straight-forward exercise. These conditions, however, never hold in practice.
Laboratory experiments designed to test the efficacy of piece-rate
contracts reveal that when subjects are given their private cost function and also
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the production function of a homogeneous good, behavior conforms to the
income-maximizing value of effort (Bull et al., 1987). Similar findings hold in a
real-effort experiment (where the cost function is endogenous and unique to each
worker) conducted by van Dijk et al., (2001). They further find, however, that
piece-rates result in lower mean outputs compared to compensation schemes
based on relative performance. Shearer (2004) finds evidence from a field
experiment conducted on a tree-farm that piece-rate schemes increase the
productivity of workers by roughly 20% when compared to fixed-wage
payments. Shi (2007) uses two field-experiments to again find productivity
increases when compensation contracts switch from fixed wage to a piece-rate
scheme. In addition to the costs associated with finding the optimal piece-rate in
practice, piece-rates cannot be implemented in most occupations since they
require perfectly measurable output. Relative performance based payment,
therefore, may offer a viable alternative which we turn to below.

4.2.2 Rank-order tournaments
The model in Lazear and Rosen (1981), shows that when the cost of
monitoring effort is prohibitively high, compensation based upon one's relative
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performance in the firm can be as efficient, and under certain conditions,
superior to piece-rate incentive schemes. They consider the incentive properties
of a rank-order payment scheme that awards predetermined prizes that are
distributed based on the relative performance of the participants. By assuming
that all workers are identical, and their behavior is consistent with the RCM, they
show that (1) the effort of all workers will increase with an increase in the prize
spread, (2) workers' effort is independent of the fallback (loser's) wage, and (3)
workers can provide the same level of effort and end up being paid different
amounts. Furthermore, Lazear and Rosen (1984) suggest that by paying workers
on the basis of their relative performance, employers save on measurement costs
and the nature of the risk borne by workers when compared to piece-rate
incentive schemes. Williamson et al. (1975) suggest that the possibility of vertical
promotion could act as a substitute to excessive monitoring by rewarding
workers that exhibit 'consummate' behavior over time. In Lazear and Rosen
(1989), however, the authors speculate that the behavior of workers in
tournaments could be affected by the perceived fairness of the ranking.
The experimental research has revealed behavior consistent with theory
insofar that tournaments and piece-rates typically result in comparable levels of
effort, but experiments also reveal that the variance of effort under tournament
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compensation schemes is usually much higher than what is theoretically
predicted. This particular pattern has been noted in chosen effort lab
experiments (Bull et al. (1987)), real effort experiments of van Dijk et al. (2001),
and the field experiments conducted in Shearer (2004). As Drago and Heywood
(1989) suggest, high variance of effort could lead to “costly and unexpected
inventory buildups, shortages, and production bottlenecks.” Another potential
drawback of tournaments highlighted in an experiment by Carpenter et al. (2007)
is that tournaments elicit a much higher tendency of sabotage. They find that the
positive incentive effects of a tournament are effectively canceled out due to
sabotage when compared to a piece-rate compensation scheme.
Frank and Cook (1995) further worry that tournament compensation
schemes might be too attractive to workers. Because of the strong behavioral
tendency for individuals to be overconfident, they fear that workers would select
too frequently into a tournament contract, even when it may not be in their best
material interest to do so. In an experiment aimed partly to test the validity of
this claim, Vandegrift et al. (2007) find only “modest overcrowding”of
tournaments across various conditions. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007),
however, find evidence from the lab that preferences for operating in competitive
environments is quite gendered with men selecting into tournament
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compensation schemes over twice as women of equal ability.
Although some guidelines of tournament design can be found throughout
the personnel literature that might aid in selecting the optimal size of the prize,
or what the prize spread should be (e.g. Lazear and Rosen (1981)), all of these
models are constructed with a preference bias. For example, it may be that
individuals may have social preferences but love to compete, or they are only
concerned with their private payoff, but do not want to compete etc. Rather than
assuming a specific set of preferences, Freeman and Gelber (2010) use
experiments to investigate if and how different variations in parameters of the
tournament design such as the number of competitors, number of prizes, and the
prize spread, affect behavior under tournament incentives. They find that effort
in a real-effort experiment (solving-mazes) is lowest when payments are
independent of performance; higher when a single, large prize is given; and
highest when multiple, differentiated prizes are given. Although most
tournaments are designed to pit workers against one another, many other
compensation schemes have been based on cooperative rewards, which we turn
to below.
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4.2.3. Group rewards: Profit Sharing and Gainsharing

Gainsharing and profit sharing incentives respectively link wages of
employees to the performance of group or firm accomplishments. In general,
profit sharing takes the form of end-of year cash bonuses and/or the deposit of
bonuses into retirement funds linked to the profitability of the firm, whereas
gainsharing plans split the financial value of gains to the firm when workers
exceed performance targets to be paid to employees as they occur. Because the
payoff to any single individual is tied to the performance of the group as a
whole, the success of group reward schemes is contingent upon the capacity to
sustain high performance from all employees despite the presence of free-riding
incentives that arise when private contributions are both (1) difficult to verify,
and (2) the extra private payoff associated with the marginal contribution of any
worker is diluted by a factor of 1/n. Within the RCM the 'free-rider problem'
would prevent group incentive schemes from being effective yet the evidence
from the empirical record is suggestive that this need not necessarily be true. In
their meta-analysis on a series of projects investigating profit sharing incentive
plans in real-world firms, Weizman and Kruse (1990) conclude that profit sharing
has at least a weak-positive correlation with firm productivity. This finding
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rightfully raises questions regarding if, how, and when free-riding affects groups
and whether there are lessons to be learned from successful cases that can inform
the development of general strategies to sustain cooperative behavior in similar
social dilemmas.
In a world without context and comprised entirely of rational agents, the
folk theorem of noncooperative game theory gives plausible stories of how group
incentive schemes can overcome free-riding in repeated interactions when the
discount rate of agents is sufficiently small so that future outcomes are valued
similarly to present outcomes (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986). Under these
conditions, cooperation can be rationally preferred and sustained through time
by egoists in infinitely repeated games when all, or some fraction of agents
(depending on the parameters defined by theory) share the exogenous traits for
specific, and credible 'tit-for-tat' or 'grim reaper' strategies.
Furthermore, reputation has been a phenomena studied extensively in
understanding the strategic behavior of economic actors in a variety of settings.
The Kreps and Wilson (1982) 'reputation effect' model shows that incomplete
information regarding the preferences of other players (egoist or altruist) is
sufficient for an egoist player to play a cooperative strategy because of the
unverifiable belief that the population may have some actors that will play a
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cooperative strategy. When evaluated in the lab, Andreoni and Miller (1993) find
evidence from a series of experiments in repeated PD games that subjects were
much more cooperative than predicted by Kreps and Wilson, suggesting that a
non-trivial portion of their subjects were demonstrating altruism beyond the
purpose of building an otherwise ‘false’ reputation. Cooper et al. (1996) test and
compare theories of reputation building with theories of altruism that explain
cooperation in both one-shot and finitely repeated PD games, but are unable to
find strong evidence in support of either theory, instead concluding that the
context of the interaction strongly drove the behavior of their subjects.
A major tool used in experimental economics, voluntary contribution
mechanism games (VCMs) have been used to study free-rider issues by creating
an environment where the option to free-ride is perfectly salient. This is done
intentionally so that when subjects decide not to free-ride, we can confidently
conclude that they did not want to free-ride. Specifically, a standard VCM
requires each subject to decide if, and how much they want to contribute to a
collective project and the payoffs are calibrated so that full contribution to the
collective project from all group members would result in a Pareto optimal
outcome. Each subject, however, has a private, material incentive to free-ride for
all strategies played by the other subjects in their same group. Over the course of
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20-30 years, data collected in the lab through hundreds of versions of VCM
games provide a handful of general lessons and behavioral regularities that
provide insight into fundamental questions regarding (1) whether the incentives
to free-ride lead to free-riding behavior, and (2) to the extent that incentives to
free-ride do lead to free-riding behavior, how free-riding behavior can be
successfully mitigated in the lab. The goal is to use VCMs to study how freeriding behavior might be overcome in an environment that strongly supports
free-riding. It is dangerous to generalize but the experimental record of VCM
games has produced some lessons for the management of the free-rider problem
that are widely recognized across the social sciences.

4.2.3.1. Lesson 1
In the absence of institutional controls, free-riding increases
Although the idea that strong material incentives to free-ride will lead to
free-riding behavior seems intuitively obvious, experiments routinely find the
tendency for subjects to act in manners that defy the predictions of theory. In the
baseline linear VCM public goods game, mean contributions from subjects hover
near 50% of their endowment in the first few rounds, with a steady decline
towards the Nash equilibrium of mutual defection after only a few rounds of
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play. The significance of this result adds credence to the fear that group incentive
payment schemes might not work by themselves since free-riding likely occurs in
the absence of institutions that counteract this tendency.

4.2.3.2 Lesson 2
Inter-group competition induces high intra-group effort.
Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) test how well alternative types of group
incentive systems explain behavior in the lab. They investigate the behavior of
groups under (1) simple revenue sharing partnerships (modeled and tested as a
linear VCM), (2) target-based systems such as profit sharing (modeled and tested
as a linear VCM with a provision point target mechanism), (3) gainsharing
(modeled and tested as a linear VCM with provision point target that generated
endogenously by the previous output of workers), (4) a group tournament
(where payoffs to the group were contingent upon relative, rather than absolute,
performance of the group against the performance of other groups, and (5) an
individual wage-cum-supervision mechanism (where the firm offers a wage to
workers provided that they provide an effort e* when on the job with a
probability p of being monitored each period; if the worker is caught working at
an effort lower than e*, she is fired). The novel finding reported in their paper is
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that group competition mechanisms led to both the highest mean output with
relatively low variance. They also re-validate previous findings from PG
experiments that only high levels of monitoring are effective in mitigating freeriding. Their data indicate that only profit sharing and revenue sharing contracts
had lower variance but they were Pareto dominated since most of the data
showed subjects playing the Nash strategy. These results are consistent with the
findings from Erev et al. (1993), and Gunnthorsdottir and Rapoport (2006) that
show how intergroup competition markedly reduces free riding -- hinting at the
importance of team identity in overcoming social dilemmas in team production.
We return to this in section 3 below.

4.2.3.3 Lesson 3:
Forcing contracts can work/higher provision points induce higher contributions.
As mentioned above, Nalbantian and Schotter evaluated group behavior
VCM's with exogenous and endogenously established targets meant to serve as
proxies for profit sharing and gainsharing incentives schemes respectively. They
note that the design of these contracts are a test of the forcing contract solution
to the free-rider problem proposed by Holmstrom (1982), where workers would
share in any revenues generated that exceed the pre-established target and
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would receive a significantly lower penalty wage if they were to fail in exceeding
the target. Theoretically, forcing contract VCM games can have multiple
equilibria similar to an assurance game (if contributions are not returned) some
of which can include positive contributions from rational individuals. Various
forcing contract VCM games in the lab have been evaluated, and results show
that subjects typically do not settle on the (socially optimal) cooperative
equilibrium (e.g. Isaac et al. (1989)) In contrast to these studies, however,
Spraggon (2002) identifies two forcing contract instruments that either tax
(punish) or subsidize (reward) subjects depending upon the relative distance of
the group total to the optimal level of contributions. Both instruments result in
socially optimal contributions. Spraggon's study provides evidence that
exogenous targeting instruments can be designed to mitigate free-riding in
groups.

4.2.3.4 Lesson 4
Punishment works.
Anderson and Stafford (2003) find that the increased probability of
receiving a punishment has a smaller effect in inducing high contributions than
does the severity of a punishment. Dickinson (2001) shows that voluntary
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contributions increase by 10-28% in groups when both punishment (sticks) and
rewards (carrots) are made available to players. Andreoni et al. (2003) also find
that the institutional arrangement where rewards and punishment are present
induces high levels of cooperation in proposer-responder games. Their findings
suggest that rewards and punishments by themselves are not as effective as a
combination of the two in inducing cooperation.
As Masclet et al. (2003) show, punishment need not be monetary. They
conduct an experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of monetary versus nonmonetary punishments. Their results suggest that monetary punishment
sustains higher contributions than does non-monetary sanctions--but not by
much. Non-monetary sanctions such as expressed disappointment and
disapproval induce higher contributions to the public good. They also find,
perhaps unsurprisingly, that non-monetary sanctions are more effective in
partner treatments, than in stranger treatments. Carpenter and Seki (2005) also
present results from a field experiment showing that disapproval in the form of a
picture of an unhappy face can induce higher voluntary contributions to the
public good.
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4.2.3.5 Lesson 5
Communication works
It may be reasonable to assume that communication among individuals is
a vital instrument in situations where socially desirable outcomes require
coordination. Ledyard (1995) singles out communication and the marginal per
capita return to be the two most important variables in obtaining cooperative
solutions in public goods games. Sally (1995) conducts a meta-analysis of social
dilemma games over a 35-year period and finds that when communication is
allowed, cooperation increases circa 40% over the baseline “institution-less”
environments. The primary forms of communication that are commonly
introduced as treatment variables in the experimental literature are cheap-talk,
and face-to-face communication.
Cooper et al. (1992) provide evidence of how pre-play “cheap-talk”—or
costless, non-binding, non-verifiable communication that does not affect the
actual payoffs -- can help achieve coordination in two-player coordination games
with multiple Nash equilibria with a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. They note
that the addition of a cheap-talk treatment does not eliminate any equilibrium
outcomes of the original game, concluding that at least theoretically, cheap-talk
should be a transparent variable action that can (should) simply be ignored.
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They find that cheap-talk can help coordination, but the rules or institutions that
govern the interaction also matter. That is, different cheap-talk regimes may
have different effects on efficient play.
The role of cheap-talk has been evaluated extensively to unpack its
robustness as an efficiency and/or fairness-enhancing mechanism under a slew of
different conditions, including its impact in ultimatum bargaining outcomes
(Croson et al. 2003) and even in its role in identifying possible scenarios in which
R&D cooperation can be obtained (Suetens 2005). Duffy and Feltovich (2002)
compare the effectiveness of cheap-talk with the effectiveness of the subject’s
access to the past observations of the other subjects. They find that effectiveness
of cheap-talk is contingent on the type of coordination game being played.
Specifically, they find cheap-talk to be more effective than access to the decision
history of other players in stage hunt games, but the results do not generalize to
the Chicken and PD games where past observations are more effective in
influencing coordination among the players.
Unrestricted face-to-face communication in experimental settings require
subjects to be in the same location so they can identify all of the other players.
Subjects are then allowed to talk about whatever they want among themselves.
In their 1994 book, Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker report in a series of
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experiments that continuous face-to-face communication more than tripled
cooperation rates in a repeated CPR games; similarly, Frohlich and Oppenheimer
(1998) found that cooperation tripled in VCM public goods games. Cardenas
(2003) conducts a field experiment in a rural village with subjects who routinely
depend on a common pool resource and finds that face-to-face communication
does not have the effects observed in experiments in Ostrom, Gardner, and
Walker. Instead, Cardenas finds that individuals who do not depend on the
resource as much as the other parties-- because their financial status allows them
allows them to ‘go to market’—are not trusted by the other subjects, despite the
many (false) promises made when face-to-face communication is allowed.

4.3. Labor-Market Conditions

Several theories investigate the relationship between job rents,
unemployment, and productivity. The main theoretical models in this tradition
share the common intuition that both the unemployment rate and wages are
positively correlated with worker effort.
The intuition of the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) model suggests that wages
that exceed the competitive market rate would reduce shirking, but if every firm
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were to raise their wages workers would again begin to shirk since they are no
longer earning a rent. It follows, however, that because all wages rise the
demand for labor would decrease and create a positive level of unemployment,
and with positive unemployment, workers would therefore not shirk since they
would not immediately be able to obtain another job if they were fired. In short,
the model predicts that the level of effort by workers is determined by both the
unemployment rate and the level of wages.
The Akerlof 1982 model is based on the notion that worker effort depends
on the work norms of the relevant reference group. He states that the firm can
raise group work norms and hence mean group effort by paying workers a “gift”
of wages in excess of the minimum required to keep workers, and would in
return receive effort higher then the minimum required to stay employed.
Akerlof and Yellen (1990), build upon this framework and put forth the slightly
different “fair-wage hypothesis” which states that workers form a notion of a 'fairwage' and will either give more or less effort if the wage they are being paid is
higher or lower than the fair-wage level. We now turn to the empirical evidence
aimed to test the predictions of these models.
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4.3.1 Testing labor market conditions in the lab

The incentive to work hard in an efficiency wage model is a function of the
rent received by a worker. The job rent can be created in two ways-- either by
paying a higher wage than the reservation wage of a worker, or by reducing
fallback position of the worker. The common interpretation of the fallback
position throughout much of the efficiency-wage literature, is that it is a function
of the unemployment rate, or more more broadly as the opportunity cost of
employment, or “the availability of other jobs, unemployment insurance, and the
like.” Bowles (1985)). The basic intuition that drives the connection between
effort and labor market conditions is such that when employment opportunities
are in low supply (i.e. high unemployment), employees would be more apt to
give full effort since they cannot easily find another job, whereas when
employment opportunities abound, the opposite is true.
In non-experimental empirical studies, this relationship has been used to
explain the rates of productivity growth (Weisskopf et al. (1983), the incidence of
strikes in the U.S. (Schor and Bowles (1987)), and the rise in work intensity in the
U.K during the 1980's (Schor, 1987). International comparisons vary considerably
across countries and the effects of unemployment on productivity appear
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strongest where industrial relations are most 'confrontational' (Weisskopf,
(1987)). Green and Weisskopf (1990) find evidence that show how the worker
discipline effect of unemployment affects different industries with different
intensities.
Turning to the lab, Falk et al. (2005) offer experimental evidence that
contradicts standard labor market models that assume minimum wages do not
affect the labor supply schedule. They find that minimum wages have
significant and lasting effects on subjects’ reservation wages which persist even
after the minimum wage has been removed. They further suggest that because
of this, profit-maximizing firms may find it optimal to increase employment after
the introduction of a binding minimum wage since fewer offers would be
rejected by prospective employees. The 2-stage experimental framework in
Brandts and Charness (2004) is similar, but workers can offer discretionary levels
of effort (instead of simply accepting an offer). They use gift-exchange games to
study the effect of two dimensions of a labor market conditions. They consider
both 1) the impact of a competitive imbalance in an experimental labor market by
creating an excess supply of firms or an excess supply of workers in the market,
and also 2) the effects of a minimum wage in the market with excess supply of
workers. They find that competition does not have a significant impact on either
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wage offers or efforts relative to standard findings in gift-exchange and only
limited evidence that workers offer less effort when a minimum wage is
imposed.
Brown, Falk and Fehr (2008), find that tight labor market conditions do
not necessarily lead to decreases in productivity when relational contracts-- or
contracts that are based upon a relationship of trust between parties-- are
established through a gift-exchange with contingent-renewal. They do find,
however, that high-wage, high-effort long-term employment relationships are
not as frequent in the slack labor market treatments they conducted in Brown,
Falk, and Fehr (2004). These papers demonstrate that the rate of unemployment
does not have a large effect on effort in incomplete labor contracts. When
markets are complete, however, they show that the presence of competition on
one side of the market leads to indifference over the identity of the trading
partner and a concentration of rents to the short-side of the market. This is also a
common finding in competitive bargaining games. For example, Roth et al.
(1991) conduct an ultimatum game with one-to-one matching and a ‘market
game’ in which a single responder can agree to an offer from nine agents on the
other side of the market. The competition among proposers drives offers down
and acceptance rates up.
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4.3.1.1 Threats

Where Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) show how a worker would avoid
shirking provided that the equilibrium unemployment rate were sufficiently
large, Bowles and Gintis (1985) further stress how employers might exploit their
'short-side power' resulting from positive unemployment-- specifically by using
threats and sanction of an employee. Although studies that evaluate the effects
of the threat of expulsion in experimental labor markets are rather limited,
Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) show that when members of a group had the
opportunity to vote to expel fellow group members, contributions rose to nearly
100% of endowments in a linear VCM game. Croson et al. (2003) find evidence
that incredible threats of future actions can influence outcomes in Ultimatum
Games, both in the short- and long-term, while Knez and Camerer (1995)
conduct ultimatum games where players received a known outside option if the
initial offer is rejected. They find that the rate of rejected offers was higher than
what is observed in typical UG environments.
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4.3.2 Gift exchange game

The gift-exchange game is usually set up so that the principal makes the
initial wage offer to a worker and workers have the opportunity of accepting
them (usually without the opportunity of making counter-offers) followed by the
choice of workers of a privately costly effort level. The payoff framework for a
gift-exchange game is therefore similar in many respects to a sequential
prisoner's dilemma since the payoffs are structured so that higher wages yield
lower monetary payoffs for firms and higher ones for workers (holding effort
constant) and higher effort levels have the reverse effect on respective payoffs for
firms and workers (holding wages constant), but the combination of high effort
and high wages is the Pareto optimal outcome. Classical game theory predicts
that workers would follow their material self-interest, and subsequently choose
the lowest possible effort level irrespective of the wage offer. In anticipation of
this, fully rational firms will only make the lowest possible wage offer.
In a series of experiments aimed at examining the behavior of people
under variants of the gift-exchange game, economists have found a strong
tendency for people to reciprocate high offers (framed both as wages and prices)
with high responses (framed as quality or effort). Fehr et al. (1998), Fehr et al.
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(1993), Gachter and Falk (2001), and Charness and Haruvy (2002), Maximiano et
al. (2007) are a subset of an extensive experimental literature that show a regular
behavioral pattern that supports the basic gift-exchange hypothesis in labor
market settings. In contrast to these studies, however, Rigdon (2002) found that a
double-blind gift-exchange with a higher cost of effort resulted in much higher
levels of free-riding. Other studies note the importance of group effects in giftexchange (Hannan et al. (2002)), and how asymmetric, or incomplete information
of the surplus can further affect reciprocal behavior (Sadreih et al. (2003)).
Gneezy and List (2006) note that the process of implementation of the gift
wage is large factor in the levels of reciprocation. Specifically, they find that
when subjects are surprised with a higher wage than they expected, they work
harder than workers earning the same wage without being surprised. These
findings are in line with a more general notion of reciprocal behavior where
individuals tend to respond positively to friendly actions, and negatively to
hostile ones (e.g. Berg et al. (1995), Fehr and Gachter (2000), Andreoni et al.
(2003)) and Falk (2007)).
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4.4. Non-pecuniary motives
“If one could enhance a common interest in nonshirking in the guise of a team loyalty or team spirit, the
team would be more efficient... Obviously the team is better, with team spirit and loyalty, because of the
reduced shirking.... [Loyalty] can be preached with an aura of moral code of conduct-a morality with
literally the same basis as the ten commandments- to restrict our conduct toward what we would choose if
we bore our full costs.”
-- Alchian and Demsetz (1972)

Through the years it has become less obvious that remuneration is always
the most effective way to increase worker motivation and satisfaction. For
example, a study conducted by Brulin and Nilsson (1991) evaluated 1500
randomly selected projects intended to reduce job stress and report that these
projects led to significant improvements in employee satisfaction and motivation.
They also found that these projects led to a reduction in production errors and
better delivery times. Terra (1995), moreover, found that the implementation of
self-regulating work-teams was strongly associated with a decrease in employee
absenteeism related to sickness in the canning industry, and Dale-Olsen (2006)
found that fringe benefits reduced turnover more than equivalent wage
increases.
Personnel economists usually focus on the influence of monetary variables
and have not made the same inroads into understanding psychological and
sociological dimensions in explaining motivation. This is partly due to the
modeling restrictions that accompany the RCM, but also because of an absence of

97

strong empirical findings to build off of. We posit that experimental methods
offer great potential in bridging what has been studied in related disciplines with
Economics. In this section we review non-pecuniary motivations and behavior
that have their inspiration in industrial and social psychology with support from
the experimental economic record.

4.4.1 Identity

Akerlof and Kranton (2005) define identity as a person’s self image — both
as an individual and as part of a group. Building upon insights from Psychology
on the effects of in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination, they model
two ways of incorporating identity into the general discussion regarding work
and work incentives. The first model highlights the idea of forming an identity
with the goals of the firm. They claim that economists have overlooked the
significance of “the identification of the officeholder with the office” and its
motivational consequences. In this model, workers experience a loss in utility
when they do not follow the rules of their superiors or act in the interests of the
firm. They additionally model a second case where workers identify at the
group level within the firm. In this model, the authors claim that there is an
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organizational policy trade-off between the introduction of a monitor-manager
and policies that foster the identification of workers with firm goals. They
describe “corporate culture,” similarly to Hodgson (1996) where 'culture' is
interpreted as internalized preferences.
When testing the claim that group identification can suppress self-interest
in favor of collective interest, the experiments conducted by Eckel and Grossman
(2005) find that in a repeated VCM overt means of identification of a team do not
generate greater cooperation than with random, anonymous team assignments.
However, when subjects were asked to work together on an unrelated and
unpaid project before playing a repeated VCM, cooperative behavior was much
higher than the baseline. These findings are consistent with in Cox et al. (1991)
where greater cooperative play has been observed in ethnically homogeneous
groups, and Charness and Jackson (2007) also find that salient group
membership affects behavior in a strategic environment.
When one's group identity is threatened in an economic interactions by an
out-group, McLeish and Oxoby (2007) find that in-group individuals cooperate
more with fellow in-group members. Furthermore, the authors observe greater
negative reciprocity among in-group individuals when the in-group’s norm of
behavior are violated.
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4.4.2 Trust and Trustworthiness

Although there is widespread recognition of the important roles that trust
and trustworthiness play in facilitating behavior when contracts are incomplete,
economists have struggled with how best to conceptualize “trust.” Berg,
Dickhaut and McCabe's (1995) (BDM) trust game, however, has standardized the
economist's interpretation of trust and trustworthiness. There are three basic
stages in the trust game. First, a proposer must decide what portion (if any) of
their endowment will be sent to a responder. Whatever the proposer decides to
send to the responder is multiplied by a factor greater than 1 (usually 3) and then
given to the responder. The responder must then decide how much (if any) of
her new sum should be sent back to the proposer. Hundreds of studies that
marginally differ from the BDM baseline game aim to illuminate how different
experimental conditions could affect the willingness to trust (send over the
endowment), or to be trustworthy (send part of the new sum back) to better
understand how to mitigate moral hazard when contracts are incomplete.
There are disagreements in the literature over the why trust or
trustworthiness are observed. For example, it may be that trust is not any
different from risk. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), however, compare the
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decision to trust a stranger in a one-shot interaction equivalent to taking a risky
bet finding that first movers require a higher probability in order to trust than in
situations where nature determines the outcome. This suggests that the decision
to trust entails an additional risk premium to balance the costs of trust betrayal.
Ashraf et al. (2006) finds that while expectations of trustworthiness explain most
of the variance in trust in their study, unconditional kindness also plays a
significant role. Conversely, they find that unconditional kindness accounts for
most of the variance in trustworthiness, while reciprocity plays a comparatively
smaller role. The findings reported by Gneezy et al. (2000) suggest that
inequality aversion is not required to observe trusting behavior using a variant of
the BDM game. These results indicate that we are getting closer to
distinguishing between Machiavellian and pure intention of that explain
observable trusting behavior, but in the meantime, we have already begun to
learn what institutional factors contribute more or less trust in a relationship.
Below we summarize some findings.

101

4.4.2.1 Past relationships

The formation of a trusting relationship is formed among a pair of people
does not imply that a trusting person in one relationship would be trusting in
another. Gueth et al. (1998) find support in favor of this claim, but EngleWarnick and Slonim (2004) find strong evidence that the length of a past trusting
relationship with a person greatly influences trust and trustworthiness in new
relationships; shorter-lasting relationships have an immediate negative impact
on trusting behavior, while longer-lasting relationships have the opposite effect.

4.4.2.2 Type of relationships

Burnham, et al. (2000) find that language matters for the outcomes in a
trust game. In different variants they use the terms "counterpart," “partner” and
opponent in referring to the person that an individual is matched with in a trust
game. These changes in wording lead to significant differences in both trust and
trustworthiness; trustworthiness more than doubles when "partner" is used
instead of "opponent." Danielson and Holm (2007) report the results from an
experiment in which all subjects were members of a church. When comparing
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the trusting behavior (of the first mover) to that of typical student samples, they
detect no differences in their findings. They do find, however, that churchgoers
returned a significantly higher proportion than do students. Engle-Warnick and
Slonim (2006) find that the level of trust is lower in relationships that will end at
a definite time than when the relationships end at an indefinite time.

4.4.2.3 Demographic and cross-cultural differences in trust and
trustworthiness:

There are several studies that essentially regress demographic variables on
trust to investigate if the socio-economic characteristics of a population can
explain trust. For example, Gachter et al. (2004) relate answers from a survey to
experimental evidence on trust from non-student and student participants in
Russia, while Fehr et al. (2002) employ a similar methodology in Germany. The
results offer an interesting set of lessons regarding heterogeneous trusting
behavior among the respective populations. The lesson may not be generalizable
but could certainly be used as an additional consideration in the development of
group-targeted policy initiatives.
More generally, Glaeser et al. (2000) find that when individuals are closer
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socially, trust and trustworthiness rise and that trustworthiness declines when
partners are of different races or nationalities. Similarly, Cassar et al. (2007)
present evidence from field experiments in South Africa and Armenia. Subjects
participate in trust and microfinance games and the study suggests that personal
trust between group members and social homogeneity are more important to
group loan repayment than general societal trust or acquaintanceship between
members. In the lab, however, Anderson et al. (2006) find that induced
heterogeneity by varying the show-up payments given to subjects did not
consistently affect a willingness to trust, or to be trustworthy. Futhermore,
Bouckaert, and Dhaene (2004) find that male small businessman in Belgium of
either Turkish or Belgian ethnic origin exhibit levels of trust and reciprocity that
are independent of their own ethnic origin, and that of the opposite party, while
Willinger (2003) again finds no evidence of discrimination in an inter-cultural
trust game between French and German participants. Fershtman and Gneezy
(2001), however, find a systematic mistrust in Israeli Jewish society towards men
of Eastern origin. Interestingly, the observed ethnic discrimination in their study
was entirely a male phenomenon. Eckel (2007) finds men less trusting and
trustworthy than women; yet Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2007) in the other
hand find that men are more trusting than women and that there are no
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significant gender differences in reciprocal behavior. Sutter and Kocher (2007)
find that trust within one's own age group increases almost linearly from early
childhood to early adulthood, but stays constant within different adult age
groups, while trustworthiness is constant across age groups. Colleti et al. (2005)
find that sanctioning and monitoring systems aimed to improve cooperation can
also increase trust among collaborators and Masclet and Penard (2007) find that
reputation management mechanisms in the form of evaluations and ratings often
found in online marketplaces can build trust and increase market efficiency.
They compare different evaluation systems -- simultaneous evaluation,
sequential evaluation, evaluation with a waiting option and find that the
existence of a reputation system increases the level of trust and cooperation.
Additionally, Fehr and List (2004) conduct a field experiment to find that
CEO's tend to exhibit behavior that is both more trusting and trustworthy than
common student subjects suggesting that the difference is perhaps due to their
recognition that trust and efficiency are often positively correlated with one
another in business practices.
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4.4.3 Intrinsic motivation

Akerlof and Kranton (2005) suggest that strong identification with the firm
might act as a substitute for remuneration to motivate employees, and that firm
identity should be understood as a “new type” of capital, since it could
contribute to the profitability of the firm.24 If one were to use Walrasian
economics as a prescriptive guide for increasing the affective attachment of
individuals, they would likely introduce better price (wage) instruments.
Decades of work in experimental psychology, and more recently in experimental
economics, has illuminated that the relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic
motivators is quite complex. For example, an experiment testing the effects of
different payment incentives for solicitors seeking collecting charitable
donations, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) find who subjects that received small
payments visited fewer houses than participants who were not paid anything for
their effort. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000b) also found that the fines that were
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Beyond economics, there are few topics in industrial and organizational psychology have been studied
as has the relation between one's job attitude and performance in the firm (e.g., Brief and Weiss, (2002),
Judge et al. (2001), Meyer and Allen, (1997), Mowday et al. (1982), Staw et al. (1994)). Numerous
meta-analyses have demonstrated that positive job attitudes, such as commitment and satisfaction, are
accompanied by better work outcomes (e.g. Cooper-Hakim and Viswesvaran (2005), Harrison (2006),
Meyer et al. (2002), Riketta, (2002)) giving credence to the classic managerial claim that “happy
workers make better workers.” Iaffeldano and Muchinshky (1985) find evidence in support of the claim
that job satisfaction is positively correlated with performance, while employees who are experiencing
low satisfaction in their employment are typically less creative and innovative, and more dis-attached
from the goals of the firm (Amabile 1996).
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implemented on parents that were late for picking up their children from
daycare resulted in a significant increase in late-coming parents. Other widely
cited experimental studies have shown that payment for blood donation
decreased blood donation (Titmuss, (1971)), fines increased common pool
resource exploitation relative to no-fine groups (Cardenas et al. (2000)), fines
deceased effort in gift-exchange environments (Fehr, et al. (1998)), and the
introduction of weak sanctions by the trustor or Nature lowered 'trustworthiness'
by responders in trust-game (Houser et al. (2010)).
Many theories from social psychology (e.g. Deci (1971), Deci, and Ryan
(1985), Deci and Ryan (2000) and also from economics (e.g. Frey and Jegen (1999),
Frey and Jegen (2001), Rob and Zemsky (2001), Huck, Kübler, and Weibull
(2003)), and Bowles and Huang (2008)) have all been developed to try to show
how intrinsic and extrinsic motives are related. For example, it has been thought
that the introduction of extrinsic motives can change either their 1) desire to
organize their own actions, 2) their sense of competence 3) their social standing,
4) their moral obligation, or 5) their identity, all of which are thought to influence
how individuals feel about performing a particular task. While the precise
mechanisms underlying the impact of extrinsic motivators on intrinsic
motivation are not well understood empirically, most theorists believe that
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intrinsic motivation can be increased or decreased if it is respectively perceived
as supportive or thwarting of any of the above factors.

4.5. Firm governance

Bowles and Gintis (1988) define the political structure of the economy as
“the ensemble of rules governing investment, production, and distribution in
economic institutions.” The political structure of the firm, although embedded
within the rules and regulations within a larger economic and political system, is
largely unrestricted in how it makes firm-wide and personnel decisions. Any
individual or group associated with the firm, moreover, can be assigned with the
responsibility of making such decisions. While it is usually the case that a
manager or a group of managers is used, ultimate control rights are said to be
held by the entity within the firm that holds the manager accountable. For
instance, in many large corporations, the manager is held accountable by the
board of directors, which in turn is held accountable by the shareholders of the
firm. The composition of the shareholders varies widely from firm to firm with
equity shares held by the public, employees, a single owner, or the state.
Although the ownership structure generally influences the distribution decision-
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control rights, this need not be the case. Many firms assign decision-control
rights to non-equity owners, including employees, and still others assign rights
to a co-governance board where equity owners and non-equity owners share
decision-control rights (Dow, 2003). One would expect, however, that the precise
location and composition of members with ultimate control can be extremely
important since different actors have both a different economic stake and/or
affective attachment to the firm, and this in turn can influence the normative
goals pursued by the firm. Control structures could influence firm policies in
determining the monitoring structure (mutual monitoring vs bosses),
compensation structure (relative payment vs fixed payment), and strategies for
market resiliency (layoffs vs wage-cuts).
While this is a relatively understudied topic in the experimental
economics literature, this section presents a summary of experiments that inform
how the governance structure of the firm might affect the motivation of workers.

4.5.1 Employee Participation in Firm Governance
When evaluating the effects of different governance structures, researchers
would ideally want to know (1) to what extent employee participation is
consultative, suggestive, or final, (2) the scope of the types of decisions made.
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The meta-analysis from Levine and Tyson (1990) over an extensive literature that
have examined various forms of industrial participation suggests that
“participation usually has a positive, often small, effect on productivity,
sometimes a zero or statistically insignificant effect, and almost never a negative
effect.” They further conclude from their analysis that substantive participation
(rather than consultative participation) over decisions that directly affect
conditions of workers on the shop-floor is most likely to produce significant,
long-lasting increases in productivity. The authors of refrain from speculating
over why participation affects productivity, though many explanations tend to be
repeated in organizational behavior and industrial psychology. Below, wherever
possible, we provide evidence testing these claims.

4.5.1.1 Participation increases the intrinsic reward of employment

Evidence from psychology suggests that individuals like to control
decisions that affect themselves. Drawing on this insight, Frey et al. (2004) argue
that authoritative decision-making structures could lead to lower job satisfaction,
which in turn could lead to lower levels of motivation. A survey from Frey and
Benz (2002) reports evidence showing that self-employed workers report higher
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job satisfaction than non-self-employed workers. They further find that workers
in large firm hierarchies report lower job satisfaction than people working in
small organizations.

4.5.1.2 Procedural fairness

According to Frey et al. (2004), the evaluation of final outcomes is a
function of the process that produced the outcome. In particular, outcomes that
result from 'fair' processes are seen in a much better light than outcomes that
result from 'unfair' processes. In a similar vein, Lind et al. (1993) find that
litigants who perceive the arbitration process as being 'fair' are much more likely
to accept court's decision than litigants who do not, after controlling for the
outcomes. Greenberg (1990) shows that employees’ reactions to pay cuts are less
averse if management thoroughly and sensitively explains the basis for the pay
cuts. Hewlett Packard's emphasis on transparent and participatory procedures
have been credited with giving the firm more flexibility than the norm. For
example, they have, on occasion, been able to temporarily lower wages by 20
percent with high support from employees (Weibel and Rota (2001)).
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4.5.1.3. Participation leads to increases in cooperation and rule compliance

In the literature on Industrial or Workplace Democracy, it is often assumed
that an equitable distribution of control rights would lead to a firm culture
supportive of higher levels of worker cooperation and trust, thereby providing
low-cost solutions to coordination failures through mutual monitoring and work
norm enforcement (Bowles and Gintis (1998)). Two recent experimental studies
have found evidence for a “democracy participation rights premium,” as it
relates to increased cooperation in simple public good environments. Dal Bo et
al. (2007) find that when subjects can vote on either playing a Prisoner's Dilemma
or a Coordination Game, higher cooperative behavior is elicited regardless of the
outcome. They attribute at least some of this behavioral tendency to the intrinsic
motivation of having been part of a democratic process (controlling for selection
effects). Similarly, Sutter et al. (2006) show that in groups allowed to elect rules
of enforcement for a PG game (punishment or reward), contributions exceed
those of groups governed by the same (non-elected) rules. In contrast to these
studies, however, Kroll et al. (2007), find that introducing a voting mechanism
has only an impact on contributions to a public good game when a costly
punishment mechanism is added. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I report
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results from a real-effort experiment comparing work teams with different
decision-control arrangements. I find that work teams that were involved in the
decision over how all group members would be compensated for their effort in
the experiment performed at higher levels than teams excluded from the
decision-making process.

4.5.2 Authoritative control

The experiment conducted by Pech (2008) compares team production
under various treatments where firm decisions over the division of the residual
claim are made by either a “boss” that is either 1) a part of the work team
(productive boss), 2) a boss that is not a part of the work team (unproductive
boss), and 3) no boss. He finds that work teams with a productive boss
contribute more to production than members in the 'no-boss' treatment after
controlling for the division of the residual. He further shows that when the
“unproductive boss” is sufficiently generous in the division of the residual,
workers still reciprocate the generosity of the boss and contribute more than
groups in the 'no boss' treatment.
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4.6 Conclusion

A firm's viability is contingent, at least in part, upon the productivity of its
workers. Workers draw upon their employment as a source of utility through
various avenues including the social interaction with other workers and
managers, the feeling of accomplishment, dignity, social status, and also through
the intrinsic reward associated with the work task itself. The firm is partly a kind
of marketplace -- with institutions that support specific contractual exchange
relations -- and partly a place where people interact expressively as whole
personalities, yet economists have primarily focused their study on monetary
variables as and neglected psychological and social variables. We speculate that
this is due to the use of the rational choice model since its assumptions define a
specific psychology and social orientation. There is no doubt that the RCM can
be an excellent first-approximation for human behavior, but as Gintis (2009)
suggests, “the well has run dry” on what we can study by sticking exclusively to
the RCM.
In this chapter we have given many examples of a growing body of
experimental data that is contributing to the study of personnel in the workplace.
While most of the studies reviewed examine the predictions of utilitarian-based
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models of motivation, others are more exploratory in nature. As we have
reported, some findings are consistent with predictions of the RCM, and others
are not. This, however, is not important. What is important is that a clear path is
now in place to move Economics into the realm of real-world behavior where
psychological, cultural, ideological, and economic influences can be reasonably
evaluated with observation rather than by assumption. The hope is for more
personnel theorists and practitioners to accept the results from experimental
studies as necessary and useful.
As we have shown, experiments offer the opportunity to test-bed
institutional innovations in the compensation structure, the labor market
conditions, the organization of the firm, the ownership structure, and the
governance structure. The main strength of using experiments is the added
control over conditions that better allow for isolating the relationship being
investigated. Experiments, moreover, can be easily replicated and expanded to
include theoretical or counterfactual ideas that may not exist in the 'real-world.'
The results from experimental data will not always map perfectly to the
population or phenomenon of interest and should therefore be thought of as a
tool that is complementary to other empirical methods.
Although experiments have been used to expand on these analyses over

115

the past two decades, our review points to some issues that remain largely
understudied. Specifically, there remains a large gap between the work done in
industrial psychology and the work in economics investigating the motivational
effects of different workplace governance practices and asset ownership
distributions. Most existing theories in industrial psychology are modeled in
non-utilitarian frameworks (possibly contributing to their neglect by
economists), but experiments offer both a method to test many of the behavioral
claims made in this work and a means of facilitating their incorporation into
economic practice. Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides an example for this
type of work.
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APPENDIX A
HISTOGRAMS
Figure A1: Total Attempts by Period and Treatment
Period 1 Total Attempted
Obs
Mean
Voting
93 12.89247
Authority
90 13.14444
Random
87 12.1954

Std. Dev.
3.34749
3.357236
2.443973

Kruskal-Wallis test probability = 0.2170
F-test p value = 0.1090

Period 2 Total Attempted
Obs
Mean
Voting
93 15.10753
Authority
90 15.83333
Random
87 14.34483

Std. Dev.
3.713847
3.598533
2.735756

Kruskal-Wallis test probability = 0.0347
F-test p value = 0.0150

Period 3 Total Attempted

Voting
Authority
Random

Obs
Mean Std. Dev.
93 13.51613 3.846548
90 14.95556 4.815497
87 13.35632 3.997025

Kruskal-Wallis test probability = 0.0371
F-test p value = 0.0220
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Figure A2: Histograms of Correct Answers by Period and Treatment
Correct Period 1

Voting
Authority
Random

Obs
Mean Std. Dev.
93 10.50538 3.154099
90 10.58889 3.613005
87 9.793103 2.54329

Kruskal-Wallis test probability = 0.5163
F-test p value = 0.1823

Correct Period 2
Obs
Mean Std. Dev.
Voting
93 12.10753 3.728452
Authority
90 12.76667 3.750805
Random
87 11.3908 3.236264
Kruskal-Wallis test probability = 0.1282
F-test p value = 0.0400

Correct Period 3
Obs
Mean Std. Dev.
Voting
93 10.62366 3.715169
Authority
90 11.68889 4.585381
Random
87 10.12644 3.753462

Kruskal-Wallis test probability = 0.0576
F-test p value = 0.0323
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APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
Introduction (Common for all Treatments)
Thank you for participating in our study today. You will earn $5 just for showing
up on time and during the experiment, you will have the opportunity to earn
more money. The amount of money that you will get paid depends on your
actions, as well as the actions of others in this experiment session. The monetary
unit that is used throughout the duration of this experiment is an 'experimental
monetary unit,' (EMU). At the conclusion of the experiment, all EMUs that you
have accumulated will be converted into dollars at the rate of 30 EMUs = $1.00.
You will be paid in cash today, at the end of the experiment. The money to
conduct this study has been provided by the National Science Foundation.
Please note that any and all actions and decisions that you make in the exercises
or responses you provide are strictly confidential and anonymous. We intend to
use the data collected from our study for academic work as it relates to group
organization. To assure your responses are confidential, we ask you to not speak
to each other until the entire study is completed.
A lab assistant will read all subsequent instructions aloud to you. Please
read along with the lab assistant as s/he read them to you. If you have any
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questions while these instructions are being read, please raise your hand and we
will attempt to answer them. You are not allowed to communicate with other
participants during the experiment, even to clarify instructions. Again, if you have
any questions, please raise your hand and a lab assistant will assist you. This
experiment will have 4 different parts; Period 1, Period 2, Period 3, and a brief
survey. At the end of the experiment session, we will call you individually by
number to give you your earnings in cash.
Instructions for Period 1 (Common for all Treatments)
In this experiment you will be completing a production task that consists
of adding up sets of five 2-digit numbers. The use of a calculator is prohibited,
but you may use scratch paper and pencil provided to you on your desk. The
numbers that you will be adding together are randomly drawn and each
problem is presented in the following way:
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After you submit an answer on the computer, you will be given a new problem
to solve. The production task of solving addition problems in Period 1 will last
for 5 minutes. At the end of 5 minutes you will be presented with a summary of
how many problems you correctly solved as well as your payment for Period 1.

Your compensation for solving problems in Period 1 will be a fixed payment of =
75 EUs.

At the end of Period 1, we will hand out a new set of instructions for Period 2.
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Period 2 Instructions (Opening Paragraph for Treatment 1: Voting)
In Period 2 of the experiment, you will be randomly put into a group with 2
other people (3 total). Group members are connected through the computer network
in this room and your identities will remain anonymous throughout the remainder
of the experiment. At the beginning of Period 2 you will receive a message that
indicates that you and the other two group members will democratically decide how
all group members will be compensated for correctly adding up different sets of 2digit numbers. The democratic process by which your group will reach a decision is
through a simple voting election. You will each vote for one of the following two
compensation schemes (CSs) which will affect the way all three persons in the group
are compensated.

The compensation scheme that receives a majority of votes will be implemented.

Period 2 Instructions (Opening paragraph for Treatment 2: One-decision maker)
In Period 2 of this experiment, you have been randomly put into a group with
2 other people (3 total). You are connected through the computer network in this
room and your respective identities will remain anonymous throughout Period 2.
Before we begin Period 2, you will receive a message that indicates whether or not
you have been randomly designated to be a 'decision-maker,' or or not.

122

If you ARE the decision-maker: You are fully responsible for choosing the
compensation scheme that will be used for all 3 members of your group (yourself,
and two others) for correctly adding up different sets of 2-digit numbers. The other
members of the group do not have any say in say in this choice. The decision-maker
will choose between one either compensation scheme 1, or compensation scheme 2,
described in detail in the following.

If you ARE NOT the decision-maker: You do not have decision-making power
over the choice of the compensation scheme. You will simply wait for the
decision-maker to implement your group's compensation scheme.

The choice regarding how all group members are compensated (either through
CS1 or CS2) is completely up to the decision-maker.

Period 2 Instructions (Opening paragraph for Treatment 3: Computer)
In Period 2 of the experiment, you will be randomly put into a group with 2
other people (3 total). Group members are connected through the computer
network in this room and your identities will remain anonymous throughout the
remainder of the experiment. Once you are in a group, a message will be sent to all
three members that indicates how the members of your group will be compensated
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for correctly adding up different sets of 2-digit numbers. The computer will
randomly choose between 1 of the following 2 compensation schemes which will
affect the way all three persons in the group are compensated.

The computer will randomly assign either compensation scheme 1 or compensation
scheme 2.

[The following are common instructions for all treatments]

Compensation scheme 1 (CS1): If CS1 is chosen, then all of the correct answers
from all members in the group are summed together. Each correct answer from the
group is worth 10EUs. Under CS1, the person who has the highest number of
contributions to the group total will receive 60% of all of the proceeds, the second
highest performer will receive 30% of the proceeds, and the third highest performer
will receive 10% of the proceeds.

For example: Let us assume that Subject 1 solves 5 addition problems correctly,
Subject 2 solves 10 correctly, and Subject 3 solves 15 correctly.
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Subject 1: 5 correct answers
Subject 2: 10 correct answers
Subject 3: 15 correct answers
5 + 10 + 15 = 30 total correct answers

30 correct answers X 10EUs = 300EUs (Total Proceeds)

In this example, the payments for each subject in the group under CS1 are as follows:

Subject 1 would receive: 300EUs X (.10) = 30EUs

(5 Correct)

Subject 2 would receive: 300EUs X (.30) = 90EUs

(10 Correct)

Subject 3 would receive: 300EUs X (.60) = 180EUs

(15 Correct-Highest performer)

Tiebreaker rule: It is possible that that 2 or more subjects have solved the exact
same number of addition problems correctly. Regardless of whether there is a 2-way,
or 3-way tie, ALL TIES ARE BROKEN AT RANDOM BY THE COMPUTER
PROGRAM.

An example of a tie between highest and second highest contributions: Let us
assume that Subject 1 solves 4 problems, both Subjects 2 and 3 solve 7 problems
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each.

Subject 1: 4 correct answers
Subject 2: 7 correct answers
Subject 3: 7 correct answers
4 + 7 + 7 = 18 total correct answers
18 correct answers X 10EUs = 180EUs

In this example, Subject's 2 and 3 have each produced the same total of correct
answers (each with 7 correct). If there is a tie under CS1, the tie is broken randomly
by the computer program.

In this example, under CS1:

Subject 1 would receive with certainty:

180EUs X (.10) = 18 EUs

Subject 2 and Subject 3 could either receive: 180EUs X (.60) = 108 EUs
(Depending on tie-break outcome)

or
180EUs X (.30) = 54 EUs
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Compensation scheme 2 (CS2): If CS2 is chosen, all of the correct answers from all
members in the group are summed together. Each correct answer from the group is
worth 10EUs.

Under CS2, every subject in the group will receive the same share of

the of the total earned by the group.

For example: Again, let us assume that Subject 1 solves 5 addition problems
correctly, Subject 2 solves 10 correctly, and Subject 3 solves 15 correctly.
Subject 1: 5 correct answers
Subject 2: 10 correct answers
Subject 3: 15 correct answers
5 + 10 + 15 = 30 total correct answers
30 correct answers X 10EUs = 300EUs (Total Proceeds)
Under CS2, all subjects receive a the same share of the group total. In this example,
the group total is 300EUs, therefore the payoffs to each member is 300EUs/3 group
members = 100EUs per subject.

Payoffs in this example (CS2)
Subject 1 receives 100 EUs

(5 Correct answers)

Subject 2 receives 100 EUs

(10 Correct answers)

Subject 3 receives 100 EUs

(15 Correct answers)

127

Period 3 Instructions
In Period 3, you will again be presented with the same production task that
consists of adding up sets of five 2-digit numbers. The use of a calculator is
prohibited, but may use scratch paper and pencil provided to you on your desk.

After you submit an answer on the computer, you will be given a new problem
to solve. The production task of solving addition problems in Period 3 will last
for 5 minutes. At the end of 5 minutes you will be presented with a summary of
how many problems you correctly solved as well as your payment for Period 3.

Your compensation for solving problems in Period 3 will be a fixed payment of
75 EU.
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APPENDIX C:
STRATIFIED REGRESSIONS BY DECISION-MAKING POWER
C.1 Introduction
Throughout the paper we report results of regression analysis that uses
the expressed preferences of subjects in the experiment that had decision-control
rights as a co-variate. Of the 270 subject that participated in the experiment, 123
had decision-control rights at the outset of Period 2 (all 93 subjects in the Voting
treatment and 30 subjects in the Authority treatment).
The interpretations of the analysis put forward in the paper hinge on the
understanding that mean differences in performance explained by the treatment
occur because the subject is a part of an entire decision-making institution (i.e.
everyone in the Authority treatment is affected the same way by being in the
Authority treatment etc). There is, however, an important issue not explicitly
considered in the body of the text. Namely, the compensation scheme
implemented in the Voting and Authority treatments is a product of the
expressed preferences of decision-makers and as we mention in the body of the
paper, there are many motivations that may drive a subject to use their decisioncontrol right one way or another (strong egalitarian ethic, the desire to challenge
or be challenged in a competitive environment, lack of confidence of winning a
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tournament, overconfidence, etc). Unfortunately, our data do not allow for clean
test to distinguish one motive over another.
Our experimental design collects preferences for some subjects (those with
decision-control rights), but not all subjects. We cannot, therefore, definitively
claim that the differences we observe in behavior are fully due to the experience
of being on one institution or another since it could be that the distribution of
preferences may not have been randomized to treatment. In short, we simply do
not know since we did not have preferences from all subjects. The worry is that
the performance of some subjects without decision-making power could be
driven by having a compensation scheme that they wanted to have implemented,
had some influence in determining, and also knew that they would perform
better under that particular compensation scheme. One way around this issue
would be to design an alternative experimental protocol that would collect
preferences from all subjects prior to revealing what the decision-making process
(the treatments) would be for each subject. This alternative design would
produce data that could directly address the critique that the results we report
are being driven by an uneven distribution of preferences for the compensation
scheme across treatments. One can further imagine a design where not only the
preferences for the compensation scheme are collected, but also a measure of the
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intensity of preferences using a 5-point likert scale or where subjects must
provide a relative ranking of the compensation schemes. After having collected
preferences from all subjects, the alternative experimental protocol would
randomize subjects in a session to treatment and the experimental procedure
would thereafter continue in the same way as the present protocol.
An alternative analytical strategy using the data collected under the
experimental protocol reported in this paper would stratify the pool of subjects
by those with decision-making power and those without decision-making power,
or alternatively further split those cell into groups along various dimensions. For
example, the sample could be divided among
•

1) Groups that have decision-making power (N = 123, Voting = 93,
Authority = 30, Control = 0)

•

2) Groups that did not have decision-making power (N = 147, Voting = 0,
Authority = 60, Control = 87)

•

3) Groups that have decision-making power and expressed a preference
for a tournament (Overall N = 74; Voting N = 55; Authority = 19; Control =
0)

•

4) Groups that have decision-making power and expressed a preference
for the revenue-sharing contract (N = 49; Voting = 38; Authority = 11;
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Control = 0)
•

5) Groups that have decision-making power, expressed a preference for
the tournament, and had the tournament contract implemented (Overall
N = 65, Voting = 46, Authority = 19, Control = 0)

•

6) Groups that have decision-making power, expressed a preferences for
the revenue-sharing contract and had the revenue-sharing contract
implemented (Overall N = 38, Voting = 27, Authority = 11; Control = 0)

•

7) Groups that have decision-making power, expressed a preference for
the tournament, but had a revenue-sharing contract implemented (Overall
N = 9, Voting = 9, Authority = 0; Control = 0)

•

8) Groups that have decision-making power, expressed a preferences for
the revenue-sharing contract, but had a tournament contract implemented
(Overall N = 11, Voting = 11; Authority = 0; Control = 0)

among many other possibilities.

C.2 Analysis

By splitting the sample into subgroups, however, we lose observations and
also the ability to make reliable comparisons in the data-- especially along further
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stratification that comes by including categorical variables in regression analysis.
For this reason, we therefore find it reasonable to stratify the data into two
groups: those with decision-control rights, and those without decision-control
rights. We will first estimating the same model for both groups groups of data
assuming that the econometric model predicts something about the behavior
within the group based on the subjects either having power, or not having power.
Below we test whether the coefficients estimated over the group of
subjects that had decision-making power are equal to the coefficients estimated
over subjects that had no decision-making power. For linear regression, the
appropriate procedure is to use a Chow or Wald test.25
First, in Table C.1 below, 6 regression specifications are reported.
Regressions 1-3 correspond to the group of subject with decision-control rights
(N = 123), and 4-6 to the groups without decision-control rights (N = 147).

25

When the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the estimators is used the Wald test is the Chow test
and vice versa.
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Table C.1 Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 2
By Power
voting
authority
cs1
male
total1
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Power == 1
(1)
(2)
0.0181 -0.0973
(0.707) (0.677)
0
0
(0)
(0)
2.147*** 1.551***
(0.619) (0.570)
2.000***
(0.640)

Power ==0
(3)
(4)
(5)
-0.0606
0
0
(0.401)
(0)
(0)
0
1.820*** 1.838***
(0)
(0.534) (0.532)
0.528
1.494*** 1.412***
(0.398) (0.500) (0.494)
1.006**
0.691
(0.441)
(0.485)
0.851***
(0.0745)
13.77*** 13.35*** 3.423*** 13.42*** 13.07***
(0.688) (0.669) (0.974) (0.426) (0.509)
123
123
123
147
147
0.082
0.150
0.684
0.128
0.140
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(6)
0
(0)
0.925***
(0.323)
0.950***
(0.282)
0.357
(0.281)
0.850***
(0.0496)
3.187***
(0.622)
147
0.71

We want to test whether the coefficients estimated for subjects with
decision-making power are equal to the coefficients estimated over subjects that
had no decision-making power. To do this we follow the sequential Wald-test
procedure from Gould (2007), of pooling the data, estimating the fully interacted
model, and then testing the second group (those with decision-making power )
coefficients against 0.
In Table C.2 we report the results of the 'pooled' regressions. Regression
(1) pools Regression (1) and (4) from Table C.1. Similarly Regression (2) pools (2)
and (5), and Regression (3) pools (3) and (6).
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Table C.2 Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 2 (Pooled)
(1)
(2)
0
0
(0)
(0)
1.820*** 1.838***
(0.535) (0.533)
1.494*** 1.412***
(0.501) (0.494)
0.691
(0.486)

(3)
0
(0)
authority
0.925***
(0.324)
cs1
0.950***
(0.282)
male
0.357
(0.282)
total1
0.850***
(0.0496)
power1
0.374
0.183
0
(0.632) (0.685)
(0)
power1voting
0
0
0.175
(0)
(0)
(1.172)
power1authority -1.838** -1.740**
-0.689
(0.885) (0.860)
(1.238)
power1cs1
0.653
0.139
-0.422
(0.795) (0.754)
(0.488)
power1male
1.308
0.650
(0.803)
(0.523)
power1total1
0.000916
(0.0894)
Constant
13.42*** 13.07*** 3.187***
(0.427) (0.510)
(0.623)
Observations
270
270
270
R-squared
0.105
0.145
0.698
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
voting

For all three 'Pooled' regressions, we fail to reject the hypothesis
simultaneously testing all linear restrictions with Prob > F = 0.1568 for Pooled
Specification (1), Prob > F =

0.1254 for Pooled Specification (2), and Prob > F =

0.3692 for Pooled Specification (3).
We conclude that there are no differences in the coefficients estimated for
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subjects with decision-making power are equal to the coefficients estimated over
subjects that had no decision-making power. We can now confidently combine
the group of subjects with decision-making power with those without decisionmaking power since there are no statistical differences between the groups.
Tables C.3 and C.4 take the same steps with effective effort as the
dependent variable. Table C.3 splits the sample between group 1 (those with
decision-making power) and group 2 (those without decision-making power.
Table C.3 Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 2
By Power
Power ==0
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
voting
0.0475
0
0
0
(0.438)
(0)
(0)
(0)
authority
0
1.861*** 1.881*** 1.061***
(0)
(0.588)
(0.586)
(0.391)
cs1
0.502
1.155**
1.066*
0.517
(0.504)
(0.559)
(0.560)
(0.395)
male
0.751
0.757
0.797**
(0.524)
(0.555)
(0.382)
correct1
0.782***
0.822***
(0.0889)
(0.0659)
Constant
10.54*** 10.20*** 3.197*** 10.67*** 10.29*** 2.561***
(0.722)
(0.736)
(0.943)
(0.501)
(0.573)
(0.754)
Observations
123
123
123
147
147
147
R-squared
0.068
0.111
0.536
0.092
0.103
0.596
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1)
0.380
(0.728)
0
(0)
1.939***
(0.612)

Power == 1
(2)
0.288
(0.706)
0
(0)
1.460**
(0.584)
1.609**
(0.664)

We now follow the Wald-test procedure from Gould (2007) of pooling the
data, estimating the fully interacted model, and then testing the second group
(those with decision-making power) coefficients against 0.
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Table C.4. Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 2 (Pooled)
(3)
1.109*
(0.587)
authority
1.061***
(0.392)
cs1
0.517
(0.395)
male
0.797**
(0.383)
correct1
0.822***
(0.0660)
power1
0.245
0.192
-0.426
(0.651)
(0.706)
(1.225)
power1voting
0
0
0
(0)
(0)
(0)
power1authority -2.242** -2.169**
0
(0.935)
(0.917)
(0)
power1cs1
0.784
0.394
-0.0148
(0.828)
(0.809)
(0.640)
power1male
0.852
-0.0462
(0.865)
(0.648)
power1correct1
-0.0399
(0.111)
Constant
10.67*** 10.29*** 2.561***
(0.501)
(0.574)
(0.755)
Observations
270
270
270
R-squared
0.081
0.107
0.568
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
voting

(1)
0
(0)
1.861***
(0.588)
1.155**
(0.560)

(2)
0
(0)
1.881***
(0.587)
1.066*
(0.560)
0.757
(0.555)

For all three 'Pooled' regressions, we fail to reject the hypothesis
simultaneously testing all linear restrictions with Prob > F =

0.1287 for Pooled

Specification (1), Prob > F = 0.1502 for Pooled Specification (2), and Prob > F =
0.4172 for Pooled Specification (3).
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C.3 Winners and Losers
The last part of this exercise investigates if there was a difference among
individuals that had decision-control rights and whether their expressed
preference resulted in the compensation scheme implemented. As mentioned
above, we would have liked to have collected preferences from all subjects in our
experiment, in part to examine this issue. We do, however, have 93 observations
from the Voting treatment were we have all of the preferences from subjects
which is not a small sample compared with other experimental studies. All
subjects expressed a preference for a compensation scheme, in order to have that
compensation scheme implemented, at least one other person in their group of
three (all interactions were anonymous) needed to express the same preference.
Below we examine if there was a difference between subjects that had their
preference implemented and those that did not have their preference
implemented. Considering only the subsample of people in the Voting
treatment, in the reference category in Regression 1 (in Table C.5 and C.6) are
subjects that had the revenue sharing contract implemented in Period 2. On
average, subjects that had the tournament compensation scheme implemented
attempted 1.988 more questions, answering 1.898 more questions on average
than subjects under the revenue-sharing contract. Both differences are significant
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at the .01 level. The reference category in Regression 2 are subjects that
expressed a preference for the revenue-sharing contract. They attempted an
average of 1.695 fewer questions answering 1.650 fewer questions than subjects
that voted for the tournament contract. These differences are also significant at
the .01 level.
In Regression 3 in from Table C.5 and C.6 we find that after controlling for
the preference expressed, subjects attempted 1.502 more questions and answered
1.407 more questions than the reference category – or those subjects under the
revenue sharing contract and also expressed a preference for the revenue sharing
contract.
In Regressions 4-6 we include the interaction of subjects that expressed a
preference for the tournament with the implementation of the tournament. In
Regression 4, the reference category are subjects that expressed a preference for
the revenue-sharing contract and also had the revenue-sharing contract
implemented. From Table C.5, those subjects, on attempted 13.85 questions.
Subjects that expressed a preference for the revenue-sharing contract attempted,
but 'lost' since the tournament contract was implemented answered an average of
0.875 more questions than the reference category. This difference, however, is not
statistically significant. Similarly, subjects that expressed a preference for the
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tournament but had a revenue-sharing contract implemented answered 0.148
more questions than the reference category (Table C.5). This is also not
significantly different from zero. Subjects that expressed a preference for the
tournament and had the tournament implemented attempted 0.148+0.875+1.277 =
2.30 more questions than the reference category. T-tests examining if there is a
difference between coefficients are all rejected.
(1) Ho: tournament = pref_tourn =tournament*pref_tourn
Prob > F = 0.7345
(2) Ho: tournament = pref_tourn
Prob > F = 0.6030
(3) Ho: tournament = tournament*pref_tourn
Prob > F = 0.8538
Similar analysis, not reported here holds for Regressions 5 and 6 and also
for Table C.6 analysis shows that there was not a difference in behavior among
subjects that 'won' or subjects that 'lost' the election of a compensation scheme
using data from the Voting treatment.
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Table C.5 Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 2:
Winners and Losers
cs1
votecs1
cs1votecs1
male
total1
Constant
Observations
R-squared

Table C.6

(1)
1.988***
(0.722)

(2)

(3)
1.502**
(0.691)
0.873
(0.697)

(4)
0.875
(0.973)
0.148
(0.966)
1.277
(1.369)

(5)
0.950
(0.952)
-0.261
(0.928)
0.820
(1.326)
1.839**
(0.840)

(6)
0.628
(0.540)
1.695**
0.199
(0.731)
(0.950)
-0.289
(1.203)
1.034*
(0.523)
0.843***
(0.0925)
13.89*** 14.11*** 13.67*** 13.85*** 13.44*** 3.411***
(0.499) (0.493) (0.563) (0.626) (0.588) (1.158)
93
93
93
93
93
93
0.069
0.051
0.078
0.083
0.134
0.669
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Voting treatment only

Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 2:
Winners and Losers
cs1
votecs1
cs1votecs1

(1)
1.898***
(0.697)

(2)

1.650**
(0.715)

(3)
1.407*
(0.745)
0.881
(0.762)

male
correct1
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(4)
0.838
(1.022)
0.222
(0.991)
1.159
(1.484)

(5)
0.895
(1.014)
-0.0885
(0.993)
0.812
(1.483)
1.398
(0.866)

10.94*** 11.13*** 10.72*** 10.89*** 10.58***
(0.426)
(0.437)
(0.470)
(0.497)
(0.475)
93
93
93
93
93
0.062
0.048
0.072
0.076
0.105
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Voting treatment only

141

(6)
0.896
(0.802)
-0.466
(1.163)
-0.105
(1.461)
0.925
(0.685)
0.766***
(0.122)
3.419***
(1.191)
93
0.484

APPENDIX D
TESTING STATSISTICAL EQUIVALENCE OF PERIOD 3 AND PERIOD 1

Table D.1 Effort (Testing Statistical Equivalence of Period 3 and Period 1)
Overall
Paired t test
Variable Obs
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
total3
270 13.94444 .2607503 4.284565 13.43107 14.45782
total1
270 12.75185 .1888527 3.103167 12.38003 13.12367
diff
270 1.192593 .1995446 3.278853 .7997248 1.58546
mean(diff) = mean(total3 - total1)
t = 5.9766
Ho: mean(diff) = 0
degrees of freedom = 269
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
-> Voting treatment
Paired t test
Variable Obs
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
total3
93 13.51613 .3988685 3.846548 12.72394 14.30832
total1
93 12.89247 .3471188 3.347492 12.20307 13.58188
diff
93 .6236559 .2785431 2.686172 .0704453 1.176867
mean(diff) = mean(total3 - total1)
t = 2.2390
Ho: mean(diff) = 0
degrees of freedom =
92
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9862
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0276
Pr(T > t) = 0.0138
-> Authority treatment
Paired t test
Variable Obs
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
total3
90 14.95556 .507598 4.815497 13.94697 15.96414
total1
90 13.14444 .3538838 3.357236 12.44128 13.8476
diff
90 1.811111 .3661366 3.473477 1.083605 2.538617
mean(diff) = mean(total3 - total1)
t = 4.9465
Ho: mean(diff) = 0
degrees of freedom =
89
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 1.0000
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000
Pr(T > t) = 0.0000
> Control treatment
Paired t test
Variable Obs
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
total3
87 13.35632 .4285261 3.997025 12.50444 14.2082
total1
87 12.1954 .2620214 2.443973 11.67452 12.71628
diff
87 1.16092 .3816401 3.559702 .4022441 1.919595
mean(diff) = mean(total3 - total1)
t = 3.0419
Ho: mean(diff) = 0
degrees of freedom =
86
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9984
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0031
Pr(T > t) = 0.0016
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Table D.2 Effective Effort(Testing Statistical Equivalence of Period 3 and
Period 1)
Paired t test
Variable Obs
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
correct3
270 10.81852 .2479742 4.074632 10.3303 11.30674
correct1
270 10.3037 .191629 3.148786 9.92642 10.68099
diff
270 .5148148 .1988346 3.267185 .1233449 .9062847
mean(diff) = mean(correct3 - correct1)
t = 2.5892
Ho: mean(diff) = 0
degrees of freedom = 269
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9949
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0101
Pr(T > t) = 0.0051
-> Voting treatment
Paired t test
Variable Obs
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
correct3
93
10.62366 .385245 3.715169 9.858526 11.38879
correct1
93 10.50538 .3270648 3.154099 9.855797 11.15496
diff
93 .1182796 .3072482 2.962994 -.4919419 .728501
mean(diff) = mean(correct3 - correct1)
t = 0.3850
Ho: mean(diff) = 0
degrees of freedom =
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.6494
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.7012
Pr(T > t) = 0.3506

92

-> Authority treatment
Paired t test
Variable
Obs
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval]
correct3
90 11.68889 .4833416 4.585381 10.7285 12.64928
correct1
90 10.58889 .3808442 3.613005 9.83216 11.34562
diff
90 1.100000 .3893238 3.69345 .3264219 1.873578
mean(diff) = mean(correct3 - correct1)
t = 2.8254
Ho: mean(diff) = 0
degrees of freedom =
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9971
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0058
Pr(T > t) = 0.0029

Variable
correct3
correct1
diff

Obs
87
87
87

-> Control treatment
Paired t test
Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.
10.12644 .4024134 3.753462
9.793103 .2726693 2.54329
.3333333 .3272636 3.052512

[95% Conf. Interval]
9.326465 10.92641
9.251055 10.33515
-.3172452 .9839119

mean(diff) = mean(correct3 - correct1)
t = 1.0185
Ho: mean(diff) = 0
degrees of freedom =
Ha: mean(diff) < 0
Ha: mean(diff) != 0
Ha: mean(diff) > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.8444
Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3113
Pr(T > t) = 0.1556
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89

86

APPENDIX E:
MOTIVATIONAL CROWDING
An alternative interpretation of the data collected in Period 3, however, is
that they measure the willingness to provide effort in the absence of any extrinsic
incentives-- or their intrinsic motivation for performing the production task.
Notice that at the beginning of Period 1, subjects had no prior experience with
the specific production task used for the duration of the experiment but by
Period 3 the subjects had 10 minutes of experience and they were also told that
their compensation would be identical to the compensation received in Period 1
(a flat-wage payment of 75 EUs). The data in Period 3 further allow us an
opportunity to study if the experience of the experiment led to any systematic
increases or decreases in effort in Period 3.
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Table E.1 Dependent Variable Total Attempted Questions in Period 3
voting
authority
tournament
tourn_preference

(1)
0.160
(0.585)
1.599**
(0.664)

(2)
0.170
(0.589)
1.582**
(0.658)
1.353***
(0.512)

(4)
0.111
(1.160)
1.604**
(0.744)
0.684
(0.567)
0.741
(1.072)
-0.502
(1.085)
1.456***
(0.533)

(5)
-0.808
(0.902)
0.683
(0.575)
0.0844
(0.455)
0.771
(0.818)
0.0573
(0.831)
0.864**
(0.416)
0.854***
(0.0691)

13.36*** 12.52*** 12.84*** 12.09***
(0.428) (0.591) (0.615) (0.636)
270
270
270
270
0.028
0.052
0.066
0.092
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

2.397**
(1.052)
270
0.451

revshar_preference
male
total1

(3)
0.172
(1.181)
1.566**
(0.744)
0.832
(0.557)
0.697
(1.107)
-1.022
(1.057)

total2
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(6)
-1.528*
(0.786)
-0.0694
(0.496)
-0.569
(0.459)
1.347*
(0.699)
0.589
(0.747)
0.356
(0.397)

(7)
-1.457*
(0.784)
0.00757
(0.514)
-0.487
(0.468)
1.236*
(0.712)
0.528
(0.737)
0.410
(0.396)
0.236
(0.161)
0.904*** 0.725***
(0.0521) (0.138)
0.534
0.144
(0.875) (0.928)
270
270
0.544
0.553

In Table E.1, we report seven regression specifications examining Period 3
Effort. Regression 7 in the table regresses effort on the treatments, compensation
scheme implemented, expressed preferences, gender, and the total number of
questions attempted in Period 1 and Period 2 respectively. Controlling for all
other co-variates, subjects in the Voting treatment attempted 1.457 questions less
than the reference group which is significant at the 0.10 level, and subjects that
expressed a preference for the tournament prior to Period 2 attempted 1.236
more questions than the reference group. Regression 7 also shows that an
additional question attempted in Period 2 resulted in 0.725 questions attempted
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in Period 3 on average. This was significant at the 0.01 level of significance.
Regression 5 shows an additional question attempted in Period 1 resulted in
0.854 additional questions attempted in Period 3 which was significant at the 0.05
level, but after including Period 2 effort into the regression specification, Period 1
effort is still positive, but no longer statistically significant.
Table E.2: Dependent Variable Correct Answers in Period 3
voting
authority
tournament
tourn_preference

(1)
0.497
(0.557)
1.562**
(0.629)

(2)
0.508
(0.553)
1.544**
(0.620)
1.424***
(0.472)

revshar_preference
male
correct1

(3)
0.534
(1.111)
1.543**
(0.721)
1.103**
(0.502)
0.405
(1.037)
-0.654
(0.987)

(4)
0.491
(1.094)
1.569**
(0.728)
1.000*
(0.509)
0.436
(1.012)
-0.291
(0.991)
1.016**
(0.499)

correct2
Constant
Observations
R-squared

10.13*** 9.242*** 9.442*** 8.922***
(0.402)
(0.509)
(0.524)
(0.586)
270
270
270
270
0.025
0.054
0.060
0.074
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(5)
-0.584
(0.905)
0.792
(0.579)
0.524
(0.394)
0.527
(0.872)
0.777
(0.772)
0.758*
(0.393)
0.772***
(0.0744)

1.810**
(0.854)
270
0.408

(6)
-1.204
(0.813)
0.128
(0.529)
0.148
(0.417)
1.290*
(0.778)
1.017
(0.724)
0.189
(0.380)

0.763***
(0.0568)
1.233*
(0.729)
270
0.485

(7)
-1.194
(0.815)
0.194
(0.520)
0.180
(0.385)
1.097
(0.800)
1.108
(0.712)
0.305
(0.370)
0.322***
(0.103)
0.556***
(0.0871)
0.347
(0.791)
270
0.513

Similar to Table E.1, in Table E.2 we report the same seven regression
specifications examining Effective Effort in Period 3. After controlling for
treatment, compensation scheme implemented, expressed preferences, gender,
and the number of correct answers Regression 7 in Table 8 shows that the
inclusion of the number of correct answers in Periods 1 and 2 are positively and
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significantly correlated with the number of correct answers in Period 3. The
respective additional effect for a correct answer in Period 1 and Period 2 was
0.322 and 0.556 additional correct answers in Period 3 controlling for all other covariates in the specification. No other co-variates are significant in the full
specification.
The findings reported in Tables E.1 and E.2 suggest that the conditions of
the experiment did not contribute to any crowding-in or out in Period 3 per se,
but they do suggest that past success in production contributed to more effective
effort in Period 3.
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APPENDIX F
SURVEY QUESTIONS
Subjective reports of satisfaction
How satisfied are you with...
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

The sense of achievement that you get from your job?
The scope for using your own initiative?
The amount of influence you have over your own work?
The training that you receive?
The amount of pay that you receive?
Your job security?
The work itself?

Employee Voice
Overall, how good would you say managers at this workplace are at...
1) Seeking the views of employees or employee representatives?
2) Responding to suggestions from employees or employee representatives?
3) Allowing employees or employee representatives to influence final decisions?
4) Overall, how satisfied are you with the amount of involvement you have in
decision-making at this workplace?
Autonomy
In general, how much influence do you have...
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Over the tasks you do in your work?
The pace at which you work?
How you do your work?
The order in which you carry out your tasks?
The time you start or finish your working day?
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